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1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of wireless technology for personal and indi-
vidualized communication,' radio frequencies have become valu-
able property.2 European Union ("EU")3 member states will in-
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thanks Professor David Gerber of Kent College Law School and Alisa Greenstein
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ditional thanks go to Professor Paul D. Klemperer of Nuffield College, Oxford
University, for his help in locating key international materials. Jessica Miller of
the Class of 2002 of the University of Pennsylvania Law School deserves special
mention for all of her hard work in refining and improving this Comment
1 Although the popular press claims the current wireless revolution is a per-
sonal communication revolution, radio spectrum in fact began its life as a medium
for personal communication through ship-to-shore radio. See discussion infra note
18. The current wireless revolution reverts back to this two-way usage: the cur-
rent revolution involves the targeting of wireless communications between two
points and the ability for mass use of a narrow bandwidth by multiple users and
services (e.g., voice, data, fax, and video).
2 Stephen Labaton, Clinton Orders a New Auction of the Airwaves, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 14, 2000, at Al.
3 The terminology used by European institutions is troublesome, because of
changes in the name of Europe's confederation and the complexity of its founding
and major treaties. Technically, EU competition law is derived from the Treaty of
Rome, which authorized enforcement of competition law by the European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC'). TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86 (now arts. 81-82), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48
[hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]. The EEC later changed its name to the European
Community ("EC"). The Treaty of Maastricht established (or re-named the body)
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crease their provision of radio bandwidth substantially over the
next five to ten years.4 To manage this amplified demand, the
wireless telecommunications industry is now adopting the Univer-
sal Mobile Telecommunication System ("UMTS") standard,5 com-
monly referred to as Third Generation ("3G") wireless technology.
6
The spectrum bandwidth necessary to operate 3G systems is being
allocated across the globe. Finland led this process by allocating
spectrum bandwidth in March 1999. 7 Currently, allocation is tak-
ing place in North America, Asia, and Europe.8 EU member states
the European Union. TREATY OF MAASTRICHT ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992
O.J. (C 191) 1, art. A. Competition law remains part of the EC, but this is a subtle
distinction. For simplicity, conformity, and in acknowledgement of the progres-
sion of European integration, "EU" will be used throughout this work to refer to
the EEC, the EC, and the EU.
4 Council Decision 128/1999/EC of 14 December 1998 on the Coordinated
Introduction of Third-Generation Mobile and Wireless Communications System
(UMTS) in the Community, 1999 O.J. (L 17) 1 (calling for increased spectrum, ac-
cording to the guidelines of the European Radiocommunications Committee
("ERC") and the European Conference of3 Postal & Telecommunications Admini-
stration ("CEPT"), to ensure a competitive 3G market); ERC Decision
ERC/DEC/(97)07 of 30 June 1997 on the Frequency Bands for the Introduction of
the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), available at
http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/docfiles.asp?docid=1519 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2002).
5 The non-profit UMTS Forum provides general and technical information
about the technology. UMTS Forum, Home Page, at http://www.umts-forum.org
(last visited Jan. 13, 2002). The non-profit is an industry association providing its
members information and research on "market, regulatory, spectrum, services,
business and technology topics." UMTS Forum, About Us, at http://www.umts-
forum.org/who are we.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
6 The first wireless wave was analog and the second was digital ("2G'). The
technical difference between 2G digital and 3G is that 2G transmits data at 10 ki-
lobytes per second ("kbps"), while 3G runs at speeds between 384 kbps and 2
megabytes per second ("Mbps"). Thomas Sidenbladh, UMTS Forum, Current
Status of 3G Licensing [hereinafter Sidenbladh, Current Status of 3G Licensing], at
http://www.umts-forum.org/information.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2000) (on file
with author).
7 In fact, Finland led the rest of the world by a year. The presence of Ericsson
and Nokia in Finland has led to that nation's leading role in the wireless services
industry. Spain was the next nation to allocate spectrum bandwidth in March
2000. UMTS Forum, 3G Licensing Overview, at http://www.umts-forum.org
/licensing.html.
8 For a comprehensive and up-to-date list, see Financial Times, European 3G
Auction Guide [hereinafter 3G Auction Guide], at http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc
?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3Y9A6QXBC (last modified Nov. 23, 2000)
(describing the current state of countries in North America, Europe, Asia and the
Middle East that have begun the allocation process); UMTS Forum, IMT-2000 Li-
censing Conditions & Status (2000) [hereinafter Licensing Conditions & Status] (de-
scribing countries in North America, Europe, Asia, and South Africa), at
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generally favor the use of auctions to allocate 3G spectrum fights.
Over time, the process by which governments distribute band-
width allocations is likely to become more complex. Auctions
bring their own problems and solutions to spectrum allocation.
The EU's originating treaties, the Treaty of Rome9 and the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"),10 contain articles
that prohibit collusion in Europe's economic markets. n addition
to collusion by sellers, European case law suggests that buyer car-
tels are also illegal under Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome."
http://www.umts-forum.org/information.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2000); Si-
denbladh, Current Status of.3G Licensing, supra note 6.
9 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, arts. 85-86 (as in effect 1957) (now articles
81-82). Article 85 states in relevant part:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings ... which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions; ...
(c) share markets or sources of supply;...
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of any agreement.., any decision... any concerted prac-
tice ... which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit ....
Article 86 states in relevant part:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as in-
compatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade be-
tween Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the preju-
dice of consumers ....
10 The ECSC competition rules are mostly of historic significance and only
pertained to the coal and steel industries. See TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18,1951, arts. 65-66, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 195-205.
The ECSC, unlike the Treaty of Rome, provides for merger review by the Com-
mission. The Maastricht Treaty formally merged the ECSC, the EEC, and the Eu-
ratom Treaty (Europe's atomic energy coalition) into the EU.
11 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, art. 85 (as in effect 1957) (now article 81); see
also Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Maclaine Watson & Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 570,
621 (Q.B. 1989) (positing that EU competition law would be violated when an
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Government investigations and prosecutions of buyer collusion are
cost and time intensive.12 Because it is difficult for the govern-
ments to punish ex post buyer violations of competition law, ex
ante methods of averting buyer cartels are critical.
The Merger Regulation of 1989,13 established under Articles 3
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,14 provides an example of an ex ante
approach to prevent anticompetitive activities. The regulation es-
tablished the Mergers Task Force ("MTF"), which reviews large-
scale mergers and joint ventures for anticompetitive effects.15 The
MTF may recommend action to block or amend a proposed merger
in order to prevent sellers from merging with the sole purpose of
forming a monopoly.16 The MTF recommendation is then subject
to approval by the European Commission.17
This Comment suggests that appropriate auction design can be
used in tandem with competition law to prevent buyer cartels in
auctions. Auctions, like other markets, are susceptible to collusion,
yet competition law is not able to punish all violations of competi-
auction ring distorted antique auction bids); RICHARD WHISH & BRENDA SUFRIN,
COMPETITION LAW 260 n.11, 396 n.7 (3d ed. 1993) (noting the effects of Articles 85
and 86 on the buyers' side). But see Case C-250/92, Gottrup-Klim Grovvare-
forening v. Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA (DLG), 1994 E.C.R. 1-5641,
5687 (holding that a cooperative purchasing association that forbids its members
from participating in competing organizations is not in violation of Article 85(1)
when the cooperative allows for more effective competition and where the re-
strictions go no further than are necessary for the proper functioning of the coop-
erative).
12 Empirical studies on this subject in the EU have not been conducted, to the
Author's knowledge. However, the United States enforcement mechanism
against Sherman Act antitrust violations is notoriously expensive and time-
consuming for the government and defendants. See MILTON HANDLER ET AL.,
TRADE REGULATION 139-42 (4th ed. 1997) (citations omitted).
13 See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter Regulation
4064/891.
14 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, arts. 3, 86. Article 3 (g) states that the ac-
tivities of the European Community shall include "the institution of a system en-
suring that competition in the common market is not distorted." Id. art. 3 (g).
15 Id. arts. 3, 86; Regulation 4064/89, supra note 13. The MTF has prosecuto-
rial discretion similar to that given to the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-Rodino filings and the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (1992). Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976,
15 U.S.C. § 18a (as amended 2001); U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines], available at
http//www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
16 Regulation 4064/89, supra note 13.
17 Id.
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tion law or oligopolistic market distortions. This is further dis-
cussed in Section 5. Auction design is not just a cost effective com-
plement to competition law; it is also the only way to regulate tacit
collusion that is either legal or difficult for the prosecution to prove
in court.
1.1. Spectrum Bandwidth Distribution Mechanisms
Countries that have already allocated spectrum bandwidth for
non-3G systems have used one of three distribution mechanisms:
(1) licensing by application (otherwise described as a beauty con-
test); (2) lottery; or (3) auction.
1.1.1. Beauty Contests
Licensing by application is the traditional method for allocating
bandwidth, 8 and is the mechanism that the United States Federal
18 Changes in a society's allocation scheme for spectrum portray a key shift in
how society views intangible public goods. In the United States, radio spectrum
was first used for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications. No license was
needed. The "ether" (spectrum) was free to all. The U.S. Navy lobbied for regu-
lation because multiple use of the same frequency diminished the quality of its
communications. Distress signals and normal day-to-day uses of the spectrum
were disrupted. In response, the government regulated radio activity. See R. H.
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-5 (1959) [herein-
after 1 Coase] (citing H.P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW (1948) and
LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY,
AcrIVIS AND ORGANIZATION (1932) (citations omitted)).
Radio and television changed the regulatory nature of spectrum. First
Amendment issues became an important consideration. Licenses were distrib-
uted for the good of the nation and for efficient spectrum usage. Ronald Coase
described the history of the early FCC in his 1959 article, The Federal Communica-
tions Commission. 1 Coase, supra, at 6-12.
Along with the ascension of the Coase Theorem in law, see, e.g., United Hous.
Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1975) (Brennan, J. dissenting); In re
Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 60 n.9 (2d Cir. 1997); Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co.,
494 P.2d 700, 705-08 (Ariz. 1972) (failing to cite Coase, but utilizing his ideas in a
unique remedy) and economics, society shifted its view of radio spectrum. Origi-
nally, society viewed the "ether" as belonging to all, for use by all. Then Coase's
Theorem, which stated that properly defined property rights would lead to the
efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial allocation, entered the fray.
See 1 Coase, supra, at 25-35; R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,
10, 15-19 (1960) [hereinafter 2 Coase]. Government now views itself as the origi-
nal owner of the public's good, i.e. spectrum. By initially allocating the property
right to itself, it can sell the property right, for profit, to private entities that can
use the assets in its product. This initial assignment of the property right to the
government both creates revenue for the government and avoids the main trans-
action costs that plagued original ship-to-shore communications. Private parties
without clearly defined rights to sections of the bandwidth could not properly or-
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Communication Commission ("FCC") uses to allocate radio and
television broadcast rights.19 As compared to other distribution
methods, licensing by application allows the government the most
control over both the type of property right owner and the usage of
the bandwidth.20 A beauty contest extends licensing by application
by charging an estimated value for the asset instead of a simple li-
censing fee.2' In a beauty contest, prospective operators file techni-
cal plans through which they attempt to prove their qualifications
for running an efficient high-tech wireless system.22 In a basic li-
censing scheme, operating fees are meant to cover administrative
costs.23 However, a beauty contest charges the winner of the spec-
trum rights a fee based on the bandwidth's value or on attempts to
generate revenue separate from the value of the bandwidth.24
1.1.2. Lotteries
Lotteries are the least widely used. In a lottery, the regulator
evaluates applicants on their ability to pay the license fee and on
any other criteria the regulator deems necessary (for example,
technical ability, free speech considerations, or political motivation
may be assessed). In the early 1990s, the FCC ran a lottery system
ganize a private system of usage. But see Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's
Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open
Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 765 (1998) (criticizing the government's presumed
ownership of spectrum).
19 See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. EcoN. PERsP., Summer 1994,
at 145, 145-46; see also Audio Servs. Div., FCC, How to Apply for a Broadcast Station,
at http://www.fcc.gov/mmb/asd/getstathtml (last visited Feb. 2,2002).
20 The Price is Right, ECONOMIST (London), July 29, 2000, at 21 (comparing
beauty contests and auctions).
21 See Only Fakirs Need Apply, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2001, at 63. A beauty contest
in this case is similar to the well known beauty contests between law firms. The
key difference is that in licensing allocation, the government announces a price
and then takes applications, rather than having the contest include a price and
quality review. The term comes from John Maynard Keynes' discussion of the
behavior of judges in a beauty contest. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 156 (1965).
22 See Fin. Times, 3G Country Information [hereinafter 3G Country Information],
at http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=F3BK8YP
XBC&live=true (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
23 Only Fakirs Need Apply, supra note 21; 3G Country Information, supra note 22.
24 3G Country Information, supra note 22.
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to distribute the spectrum rights for wireless phone services. 25 The
lottery was a dismal failure, as small corporations without the ca-
pacity to operate wireless services won the lottery and then sold
the assets, for seven-figure profits, to established telecommunica-
tions companies in a private market auction.26 In allocating 3G
spectrum rights, countries have ignored this long-established dis-
tribution method in favor of either a beauty contest 27 or an auc-
tion.2 8
1.1.3. Competitive Tendering29
Auctions were first used to distribute spectrum rights for radio
and television stations in New Zealand in 1990.30 In an auction, the
government sells the property rights to the highest bidder at prices
that are not known ex ante by the government or, presumably, by
the participants. This system of bandwidth allocation has been
adopted by the United States3' and by several European and Asian
countries. 32
A properly-designed auction provides the most efficient allo-
cation of rights and revenue generation for national governments.
An auction provides efficiency both by delivering the spectrum
rights to the most efficient user and by quickly allocating the rights
25 McMillan, supra note 19, at 146; Peter Passell, Administration Seeks Profits in
Plan to Auction Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1991, at Al (discussing the Bush
administration's proposal to switch from lotteries to auctions).
26 See McMillan, supra note 19, at 146; Peter Passell, Big Brother Wants to Man-
age the Broadcast Spectrum Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at D2. For further dis-
cussion of this predicted Coasian outcome, see discussion infta Section 2.4.
27 Beauty contests are being used in France, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, and Sweden. Licensing Conditions &
Status, supra note 8.
23 See Paul D. Klemperer, Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction The-
ory, Presentation at 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, at 31-32 (July
2000) [hereinafter 1 Kiemperer], available at http://www.econ.washington.edu
/worldcongress/klemperer.pdf; McMillan, supra note 19, at 146; 3G Auction Guide,
supra note 8.
29 Government auctions are referred to as competitive tendering in the British
and European competition literature.
30 McMillan, supra note 19, at 148 (describing the dismal failure of using sec-
ond price sealed bids because only a few bidders participated).
31 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Application for License), 47
U.S.C. § 309 (West Supp. 2001) (allowing the FCC to allocate spectrum space by
auction).
32 See 3G Auction Guide, supra note 8; Sidenbladh, Current Status of 3G Licens-
ing, supra note 6.
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to the user.33 Additionally, auctions can provide higher possible
revenues for a government than a beauty contest.34 Auction theory
is important for the wireless telecommunications market, as well as
for other industries. This is because auction design can prevent
collusion between buyers more cheaply and efficiently after the
auction and violation have occurred than investigations and prose-
cutions under competition law can.
1.2. The Importance of Auction Design
Once a national government makes the decision to auction its
spectrum bandwidth, several complications can arise. First, auc-
tions can cause what is known as a "winner's curse." 35 Second,
auction outcomes are dependent on the number and type of par-
ticipants that the auction attracts. 36 Third, collusion can occur
among the bidders, which may or may not violate EU competition
law.37 A properly-designed auction in the EU must deal with all
three of these issues.
Ex ante auction design provides a key complement to and sub-
stitute for ex post competition law enforcement. EU competition
law enforcement, like its American antitrust counterpart, is
costly.38 A properly-designed auction can prevent, or at least
33 Paul Klemperer, Sold! The Case for Auctions, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 9, 2000,
at 11.
34 Because the spectrum bandwidth sold in auctions will be used for purely
commercial applications, revenue generation is considered an appropriate public
policy goal. This is different from prior uses of radio frequencies. Radio and
broadcast television bandwidth combined concerns of content, free speech, infor-
mation dissemination, and commercial applications. Auctions may not have been
appropriate for radio and television because societies and governments (some-
times even constitutions) decided that content and speech issues predominated
over revenue concerns.
35 See E.C. Capen et al., Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, 23 J.
PETROLEUM TECH. 641, 641-53 (1971); see also James Surowiecki, The Agony of Vic-
tory and the Thrill of Defeat, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 31 (using the record-
setting contract settlements of Alex Rodriguez with the Texas Rangers and Hillary
Clinton with Simon & Schuster to provide a basic, light-hearted explanation of the
winner's curse).
36 See Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 180,180-94 (1996).
37 See Restrictive Practices Re Industrial Timber, [19761 1 C.M.L.R. D1l (1976)
(holding that private groups that colluded to fix prices are not permitted to take
steps to restrict competition).
38 See HANDLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 104-05, 113-17, 139-42; W. KP Viscusi,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 33-38, 64-67 (2d ed. 1995).
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lower, the probability and effectiveness of collusion. An auction
will increase efficiency by lowering government monitoring and
prosecution costs, in addition to providing the traditional effi-
ciency gains associated with auctions: increased sales price and
quick distribution of assets to the most efficient user.
39
It should be noted that this Comment uses 3G spectrum auc-
tions in Europe to display an example of auction theory's applica-
tion as a means of complementing competition law enforcement
through a low-cost regulatory allocation system. Auction design
must, of course, be tailored to the industry and commodity being
allocated. The goal of this Comment is to suggest a process that
can be generally adopted by governments and private entities in
order to design auctions in a variety of fields outside of spectrum
bandwidth.
Section 2 of this Comment addresses the governments' major
goals in allocating 3G spectrum rights to the private sector. These
goals are both pro- and anticompetitive. Section 3 provides a basic
model of a firm's decision to enter an auction. The key determina-
tive factor in preventing collusion may be the ability to attract a
sufficient number of bidders. Section 4 discusses problems inher-
ent in all auctions (including "winner's curse," risk aversion, num-
ber of firms, and collusion) and the features of auction design that
can solve a problem that is unique to the 3G market. Since the
most perfect form of an efficient auction may not be able to incor-
porate all of these solutions, Section 4 also focuses on collusion, the
most complex legal dilemma of an auction. This Section discusses:
(1) the factors that facilitate collusion; (2) the elements of a cartel;
(3) the form auction collusion may take; and (4) auction design so-
lutions to combat these problems. Section 5 of this Comment dis-
cusses basic EU competition law governing cartels. It attempts to
provide a background on the hearing process and the problems in-
herent in the EU's approach toward prohibiting cartels. Most im-
portantly, this Section discusses an anticompetitive practice that is
illegal in most countries but legal under EU competition law. Sec-
tion 6 compares and critiques the auction regulations that have
been promulgated and used by the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Italy in allocating their 3G spectrum. This Section attempts to
answer why the British and German auctions raised substantially
39 See McMillan, supra note 19, at 159-60; "Auctions Are a Better Way to Raise
Revenue than Taxes," Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2000, at http://www
.businessweek.com/.
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more revenue per capita than the Italian auction. Section 7 pro-
vides simple solutions to the problems discussed in those three
auctions.
2. GOVERNMENT GOALS WHEN DISTRIBUTING SPECTRUM RIGHTS
In allocating 3G spectrum rights to the private sector, govern-
ments have both pro- and anticompetitive goals. Auctions will
meet the pro-competitive goals, but ignore the desired anticom-
petitive goals.
2.1. Efficient and Competitive Markets
Governments have an interest in efficiently allocating wireless
services in their domestic markets. Additionally, governments
wish to ensure that the benefits of selling public property (spec-
trum) are used to provide low-cost services. To this end, govern-
ments want to ensure that the most efficient firms own the spec-
trum rights. If 3G service prices rise, then wireless services will be
under-utilized while other goods will be over-utilized. In eco-
nomic terms, the efficient firm will have low costs and can poten-
tially provide low competitive prices.40
Governments desire not just potentially competitive prices but
actual competitive and efficient markets that provide low prices
and technical advances.41 Because of the limited bandwidth and
the limited number of firms technically capable of providing 3G
wireless services, governments have sold rights to an oligopoly.
The largest European market, Germany, sold six spectrum blocks,
which resulted in the highest number of competitors.42 Most
40 The firm will be a "price taker" in the sense that any single firm's output
will not affect price and the firm must take the market price as given. See HAL R.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 362-64 (3d ed. 1993).
41 See C.V. BROWN & P.M. JACKSON, PUBLIC SECTOR EcONOMIcS 28-30 (4th ed.
1990).
42 Sidenbladh, Current Status of 3G Licensing, supra note 6, at 6 (2000). A six-
firm market will have a minimum 1666 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ('1HHI")
value. The HHI index describes the market concentration in numerical form. A
high HHI is evidence of a high price-to-cost ratio. See Ian Domowitz et al., Busi-
ness Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins, 17
RAND J. EcoN. 1, 1-17 (1986). The HHI is used by the EU and the United States
antitrust authorities. See Commission Decision Case 2000/276/EC of 22 Septem-
ber 1999 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the Common Market
and the EEA Agreement (Case IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice), 2000 OJ. (L
93) 1 (preventing a merger between two travel tour operators because of anticom-
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European countries have sold only four spectrum blocks.4
3
Whether tacit or explicit collusion results, there is still a risk of
above competitive prices. The distribution system should be de-
signed to minimize the risk of future collusion.
2.2. Revenue Generation for the Sale of Public Property
Spectrum rights represent a valuable asset that is initially
owned by the public.44 The revenues earned by the sale of spec-
trum rights can have a significant impact on a country's budget
deficit.45 During the period in which the European governments
were deciding on a method for allocating their spectrum rights,
Europe had generally high unemployment and debt levels. Un-
employment may worsen if governments attempt to reduce budget
debts or deficits by raising taxes.46 However, raising revenue
through the sale of assets avoids the negative effects of taxation
due to crowding out and dead weight loss.
47
Revenue generation is a parallel goal to the efficient use of an
asset and to an efficient market.48 The most efficient firms will
place the highest valuations on the spectrum rights. They will be
petitive impact); Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, § 1.5, nn.17 & 18 (as
amended 1994).
43 The U.K., the Netherlands, and Italy have each distributed five blocks.
Belgium, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland have
each distributed four (note that Switzerland is not a member of the EU and there-
fore not subject to EU competition law). Austria is planning to provide between
four and six blocks. Ireland is planning to distribute three to five blocks. Licens-
ing Conditions & Status, supra note 8, at 3-5. Four firms have a minimum 2500 HHI
rating and five firms have a minimum 2000 HHI rating.
44 See supra text accompanying note 18 (describing the intellectual change as
to ownership of radio frequencies in light of the Coase Theorem). But see Noam,
supra note 18, at 765.
45 For example, the U.K. government debt was a declining £305 billion as of
November 2000, with a government surplus of £35.4 billion including the 3G
wireless proceeds. The British 3G auction raised £22 billion, which is equivalent
to 7.2% of the government's debt. See Record UK Budget Surplus, BBC NEWS, Nov.
20,2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1032000
/1032126.stm.
46 N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 103-09 (3d ed. 1997).
47 See Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, at 12-13 & n.7
(preliminary draft) (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter 2 Klemperer], at
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm.
48 Id. But see PATRIcE GEOFFRON, PARIS TELECOM, THE GRANTING OF UMTS
LICENSES IN EUROPE: INDUSTRIAL AND MACROECONOMIC EFFECTs 9-10 (2001) at
http://www.enstfr/egsh/news/fichiers %20pdf/IR15.pdf (arguing that revenue
generation violates the EU's goal of efficient 3G markets and rate schedules).
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the most willing to pay for the assets because they would have the
lowest costs and, therefore, the highest potential profit margins.49
Optimal revenue generation coincides with an efficient market. 0
2.3. Revenue Generation as a Fee for Franchise Tendering
Government revenue generation may be a goal in itself, but it
may also replicate the value of licensing an oligopoly. For in-
stance, many economists propose auctioning off the rights to oper-
ate a monopoly rather than employing a regulatory body to en-
force an artificial market through price and quality controls.51
Franchise bidding forces potential monopolists to submit bids and
purchase the rights to the monopoly franchise. The most efficient
potential monopolist will have the highest valuation and the high-
est bid, and will win the right to operate the monopoly.5 2 Alterna-
tively, the auction could award the rights to the firm that bids the
lowest rates for customers rather than the highest fee paid to the
government.53 The winner, as the most efficient firm, would be
able to submit the lowest consumer rate schedule. The goal of this
auction is to force the firms to bid their marginal cost as their rate
schedule. Submission of consumer price schedules would work
well in a technologically stagnant industry selling a homogeneous
product. However, the 3G wireless services market has continual
technological change, and spectrum space can be used to supply
various products. The correct monopoly franchise price will be an
unknown to the government and the firms. Therefore, if a 3G auc-
tion is to replicate a franchise bidding situation, the auctioneer
should charge an up-front sales price plus a continuing royalty fee.
The winning bid will be the one offering the most lucrative royalty
fee. The royalty fee will more properly allocate the risk of the in-
49 William Vickery, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,
16 J. FIN. 8 (1961), available at http://links.jstor.org.
50 Revenue generation should be optimal and not maximizing. Maximizing
would entail using the winner's curse (discussed in Section 4.1) to inefficiently in-
flate the price above the asset's value. This distortion will lead to higher input
prices, lower profitability, and higher wireless services prices. Wilson, infra note
83, at 446-48.
51 See, e.g., JOHN CULLIS & PHILIP JONES, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
134-36 (1992); Martin Cave & Peter Williamson, The Regulation of British Broadcast-
ing, in THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE 160, 171-87 (Matthew Bishop et al. eds., 1995).
52 See CULLIS & JONES, supra note 51, at 134-36.
53 Id.
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vestment and will act as a discriminatory pricing method for the
government.
Franchise bidding is generally used to privatize those tradi-
tionally state run operations that are viewed as natural monopo-
lies.54 A spectrum rights auction may have, as its goal, revenue
generation to compensate the public for post-allocation tacit collu-
sion. A well-designed auction aims, in part, to reduce asymmetric
information. However, the government and the other firms do not
know each firm's private valuation. In an oligopoly, firms have a
private estimate of their post-auction profits. Competition laws
can police for illegal explicit collusion. But collusion is often tacit,
unknown, and legal under EU competition law.55 The govern-
ment's lack of accurate information will prevent adequate policing
of the market. Furthermore, even when collusion is explicit, it may
be hard to reveal and costly to prosecute. In an auction, the firms
will reveal their valuation (willingness to buy) to regulators. An
ascending auction ends when the firms that value other investment
opportunities more than they value the oligopoly position in the
3G market leave the auction. As the auction price rises, a firm's
costs (mostly sunk costs, but there may be variable costs if royalty
charges are part of the sales agreement) will also rise. Thus, po-
tential profits are reduced with each bidding round and the pro-
ceeds go to the government treasury. With each bidding round,
the revenue generated would approach the oligopoly overcharge
that results from collusion.56 There would be less need for post-
distribution competition law enforcement because the public was
compensated ex ante through an auction rather than ex post
through litigation
54 See MICHAEL KLEIN, BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS 1-3 (World Bank Group,
Working Paper No. 1957, 1998) (providing an overview of privatizing and fran-
chise bidding), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/view .phptype=S&id=777;
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (advocating
competitive tendering of government run utilities).
55 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 2-3; ~ id. at 17-18 (calling for improved anti-
trust enforcement by the EU to prevent explicit collusion in the form of joint ven-
tures).
56 As the bidding price increases, the auction price will tend to increase to-
wards the asset's value to an oligopolist rather than to a competitive operator.
This is the maximum price an oligopolist will pay before the capital would yield
higher returns in another investment.
57 The public may only be compensated for an oligopoly or tacit collusion
overcharge because an explicit collusion has not yet formed and was not taken
into account by the bidders. The explicit collusion will result in higher profits and
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2.4. Speed of Implementing an Efficient Market
If spectrum rights are quickly allocated to the most efficient
firms, consumer and producer surplus will be maximized.58 The
public's utility (consumer surplus) will be increased because it will
be able to use new 3G wireless services sooner. Profits (producer
surplus) will be maximized by reducing transaction costs associ-
ated with an inefficient initial distribution of spectrum rights. If
the spectrum rights are transferable (like other property rights) but
are initially distributed to less efficient firms, then the efficient
firms will purchase the assets by merger or acquisition after the
auction.5 9 This delay in the process will cost firms, capital markets,
and ultimately the consumer, transaction costs in the form of legal
and financial services.
A well-designed auction provides the quickest means of dis-
tributing assets to the most efficient firms. 60 Under a licensing
system, lottery system, or beauty contest, the asset may, and likely
will be, allocated to a less efficient firm. Two outcomes may occur
in this setting. First, in line with the Coase Theorem, the most effi-
cient firm will eventually purchase the assets in the private mar-
ket.61 Depending on the market structure or regulation, these more
efficient firms will purchase the assets directly,62 merge with the
winning owner,63 or form joint ventures.64 The transaction costs
prices than tacit collusion. Otherwise, there would be no incentive to form ex-
plicit collusion once the rights to an oligopoly have been purchased.
58 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 15-16 & n.35 (citing Roger B. Myerson &
Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade, 29 J. EcoN. THEORY
265, 265-81 (1983)).
59 See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFERY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONoMics 28-29, 76-77 (1993) (describing a bidding ring where a low bidder
resells to a purchaser for a higher value after the auction has taken place).
60 McMillan, supra note 19, at 145, 147, 159-60.
61 2 Coase, supra note 18, at 1.
62 McMillan, supra note 19, at 146 (discussing how a lottery system awarded
an unknown company exclusive cellular rights to Cape Cod and then sold the
rights to Southwestern Bell for $41 million).
63 The day after the German auction ended, BT announced plans to double its
ownership of Viag, one of the auction winners, from forty-five percent to ninety
percent. BT Deal Strengthens Control Over European Telecoms Network, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2000, at 18.
64 The winner of the largest U.K. license was TIW, a Canadian company in
which Hutchinson Whampoa, the Hong Kong trading group, has a small stake.
TIW paid £4.38bn for the license. Hutchinson said it was forming a joint venture
with TIW to offer next generation services on TIW's network. See 3G Country In-
formation, supra note 22; see also infra note 94.
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associated with the redistribution of the assets will delay the effi-
cient use of the spectrum.
The second possible outcome would be a sub-optimal use. If
the transaction costs of redistribution are larger than the difference
in valuation between the original owner and the most efficient
owner, the spectrum rights will not be redistributed to the most ef-
ficient firm.65 The market will be stagnant on a sub-optimal, yet
Pareto-efficient, outcome.
An auction that initially distributes the spectrum rights to the
most efficient firm will avoid the transaction costs of delay and a
potentially sub-optimal outcome.
2.5. Domestic Favoritism
Although not always an economically efficient goal, govern-
ments may prefer to award spectrum rights to domestic firms.
66
Specifically, governments may have a preference for former state-
owned monopoly telecommunications companies. This suspicion
has been reinforced by the distribution of 3G spectrum blocks thus
far. Sweden, using a beauty contest, was the first and only country
to deny a 3G license to its biggest domestic telecom. 67 Eleven of the
other twelve European countries that distributed spectrum rights
awarded at least one license to its former state-owned monopoly.68
The EU forced a cross-border deregulation of Europe's telecom-
munications industry.69 This deregulation forced EU member
states to accept applications or bids from non-domestic firms.70
Governments may forgo the auction system in favor of a beauty
65 See James M. Buchanan, Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Inter-
pretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L. & ECON. 439, 445-48 (1972) (showing how
high transaction costs will stifle the competitive transfer of property rights).
66 See German Phone Auction Bonanza, BBC NEws, Aug. 17, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/H/english/business/newsid_884000/884203.stm.
67 Sweden's former state-owned monopoly, Telia, was denied one of the four
3G blocks. Swedes Set for Early 3G Phone Coverage, BBC NEws, Dec. 17,2000, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1074000/1074894
.stm. Telia later entered the 3G market by forming a joint venture with 3G spec-
trum winner NetCom AB. Nicolas George, Swedish Groups Link Up Over 3G, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://globalarchive.ftcom/globalarchive/article
.html?id=010124001 279; see also 3G Country Information, supra note 22 (summariz-
ing the events of Sweden's 3G spectrum allocation).
68 See 3G Auction Guide, supra note 8.
69 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at Telecom De-
regulation: The European Advantage, 12 HARv. J.L. TEcH. 561,574-75 (1999).
70 Id.
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contest, despite the Swedish result. A beauty contest provides
government discretion and allows the government to ensure that at
least one license goes to a domestic telecommunications com-
pany.71
Even when an auction is used, the former state-owned monop-
oly could still have an advantage. First, it may receive tax advan-
tages, deferred taxation, accelerated depreciation, grants, soft
loans, or direct subsidies. 72 Second, the former state-owned do-
mestic companies may be too big to fail. If the domestic firm has a
substantial presence in the domestic economy, it may be politically
and economically untenable for the firm to enter bankruptcy. If
that is the case, large domestic carriers may be able to inflate their
bids well above their true valuation of the asset. If and when the
over-payment causes losses, the government may provide assis-
tance.73
71 Sometimes governments may favor foreign firms. There have been accu-
sations that South Africa awarded a Saudi-backed consortium, Cell-C, the rights
to the country's third 3G services license in an obscure auction and beauty contest
hybrid, in order to meet various goals. Cell-C is sixty percent owned by Saudi
Oger, a Saudi Arabian group, and forty percent owned by thirty-two domestic
black empowerment groups. South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki was due to
travel to Saudi Arabia the day after the license was awarded to discuss an arms
deal between a government-owned arms manufacturer, Denel, and Saudi Arabia.
Some of the thirty-two black empowerment groups are now under investigation
for arms sales to Saudi Arabia. See Nicol Degli Innocenti, Mbeki Denies Saudi Influ-
ence, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com
/globalarchive/article.html?id=010 219008289.
72 Anticompetitive taxes and direct subsidies that favor one corporation or
domestic industries over other European competitors are illegal under EU com-
petition and state aid law. See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, arts. 73, 90, & 92-94
(as in effect 1957) (now articles 86-89); Eighth Survey on State Aid in the European
Union, COM(2000)205 final paras. 1-5, 90-92 [hereinafter Eighth Survey on State
Aid], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2000/com2000
0205en01.pdf. "State aid can frustrate free competition by preventing the most
efficient allocation of resources and pose a threat to the unity of the single mar-
ket." Id. para. 1.
73 For example, the EU approved state aid to cover losses to the segment of
the maritime transportation industry operating "thinly serviced routes." See
Eighth Survey on State Aid, supra note 72, para. 68 (citing Community Guidelines
on State Aid to Maritime Transport, 1997 O.J. (C 205) 5). The two most famous
corporate bailouts in the United States are the 1989 savings and loan bailout, and
the government assistance offered to Chrysler. See Timothy Canova, The Trans-
formation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Re-
ceivership, 60 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1295, 1330 (1995) (discussing banking industry
change, the high rate of bank failures in the 1980s, and the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)); Cheryl D. Block, Overt
and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951 (1992) (dis-
cussing the bailouts of Chrysler and Lockheed).
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2.6. Auction as the Best Option
The previously mentioned government goals (other than the
anticompetitive domestic favoritism and political goals) can be best
satisfied by an auction. In an ideal auction, several goals will be
realized because the firm with the highest valuation will pay the
highest price and win the auction. First, the winning firm will be
the most efficient and the 3G services will be allocated quickly to
the most efficient service provider. Second, the government will
earn revenues on an asset that costs the public nothing to ownY4
Third, the revenue will fund government expenditures (whether
debt repayment, goods, or services) while avoiding the need to
raise the auction revenue amount through taxes. The revenue will
also compensate the public ex ante for the ex post oligopoly service
overcharge to the consumer.
Once an auction is chosen, auction-specific problems arise. The
design of the auction is essential to fulfilling the goals listed above.
Game theory, and, more specifically, auction theory, must be used
to identify and solve auction pitfalls. No one auction may be ap-
propriate for all industries or commodities, but a properly de-
signed auction provides the best outcome.
The mere fact that applications in a lottery, licensing, or beauty
contest scheme outstrip the supply of auction blocks shows that the
free market value of the asset is higher than the government's
posted price. In an efficient auction, the winner pays a market
clearing price. This is the price where supply equals demand and
no other bidder is willing to pay more. While a beauty contest may
attempt to allocate the assets to the most efficient firms, an auction
provides information. Each new bidding round of an auction
forces the firm to reevaluate its willingness to pay for the asset.
Regulators distributing assets in a beauty contest face an asymmet-
ric information problem that an auction can solve.
3. A BASIC MODEL OF AUCTION ENTRY
Economists Cournot and Bertrand began to model oligopoly
behavior in the late 19th century.75 The basic lesson of their static
74 There will be opportunity costs. The licensee secures the use of the band
only for wireless communication services for a set period of time, usually twenty
years. The government will be unable to allocate the asset for itself or for other
purposes during the length of the license.
75 See VARIAN, supra note 40, at 472-79; Viscusi, supra note 38, at 108-09,113.
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models is that as the number of competitors rises, the individual
firm's effect on price decreases and the market tends towards
competitive prices.76 At a basic level, auctions are similar to these
models. As the number of participants rises, the auction price will
tend to rise. 7 The key difference is that oligopoly market prices
tend towards competitive prices while auction prices tend to rise
with the efficiency of the price in dispute.
As this Comment will discuss, one of the key factors, if not the
key factor, in a successful 3G services auction is whether there is a
sufficient number of participants. Firms will make a decision to
enter an auction based on the expected value of its outcome as de-
termined by a cost benefit equation:
Prob(Bi>Bj) * (V,-Bi) > C
In the preceding equation, Bi represents the bid of firm i; Bj rep-
resents the bids of all other firms; Vi represents the value of the as-
set to firm i; and C is the cost of entering the auction. Firm i will
enter the auction if firm i's expected value of entering the auction
outweighs the costs. The expected value of entry is firm i's per-
ceived probability that its bid will be larger than all other bids
times the profit margin of operating the license.
In most introductory game theory literature on auctions, all
bidders are assumed to be similarly situated. In the 3G services
market, there are known dominant players. Depending on the
country, these may include the former state-run monopoly tele-
phone company, existing domestic wireless operators, or the typi-
cal line-up of international heavyweight telecommunications com-
panies (AT&T, NTT DoCoMo, BT, Deutsche Telekom, etc.). As a
result, the probability of securing a license depends, in part, on the
number of dominant firms in relation to the number of spectrum
blocks. The number of dominant firms in relation to the number of
spectrum blocks determines the revenue potential for the auction.
Third Generation spectrum auctions are games of partially in-
complete information.78 Potential bidders will know the dominant
76 See Viscusi, supra note 38, at 112-15.
7 The key difference is that oligopoly models tend towards efficient prices
while auction prices rise; the end price in relation to an efficient price is debatable.
78 The following assumptions will be used in the ensuing discussion: first, all
firms are risk neutral, but risk adverse to a winner's curse; second, each player
knows its own valuation of the asset; third, each non-dominant firm's valuation is
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firms participating in an auction and may even know the order in
which the firms value the spectrum blocks. However, potential
bidders are unlikely to know the rank order of the non-dominant
firms.79 The following table shows the probability that each type of
bidder will win a license as the number of dominant firms ("D")
changes in relation to the number of spectrum blocks ("N").
Non-Dominant Firm Dominant Firm
N<D Prob=O O<Prob<l
N=D Prob=O Prob=1
N>D 0<Prob<l Prob=1
The government is the monopoly seller of the spectrum rights.
To maximize profits, the government, as the monopoly seller,
would set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs. In a spectrum
auction, there are no marginal costs because the government is
distributing a public good and not producing a good. Radio spec-
trum also has unique features. The government owns a set amount
of the frequency to distribute. As the number of spectrum rights
increase, the size of each block decreases, and so does its quality
and value. The change in quality will shift the demand curve hori-
zontally. If the government wishes to maximize profits, it will
need to compare profit margins between different demand curves
with shifting marginal revenue curves rather than setting marginal
cost equal to marginal revenue.
However, when the number of blocks equals the number of
dominant firms, the outcome will be known by all potential bid-
ders ex ante. The blocks will simply sell at the reserve price. If the
auction has fewer blocks than dominant firms, the price of an indi-
vidual block, absent collusion, will be higher and the bidding will
independently and uniformly distributed; fourth, dominant bidders have low
costs to gather information; fifth, non-dominant firms are independent, but are
distributed at the upper end of the distribution (possibly as high statistical out-
liers); sixth, bids are constrained to be no less than the reserved price. All of this is
common knowledge. Cf. ROBERT GIBBONS, A PRIMER IN GAME THEORY 155 (1992)
(listing assumptions in a second price Vickery auction between two independent
and uniformly distributed bidders).
79 Each bidder assumes that the valuations of non-dominant firms lie on a
distribution. This occurs because each non-dominant firm's valuations are inde-
pendent of each other, and bidders are risk-neutral because this is incomplete in-
formation. See GIBBONS, supra note 78, at 155-57.
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occur only among the dominant firms.8 0 When the number of
blocks is larger than the number of dominants, then a non-
dominant is guaranteed a block and the bidding will stop when
only one non-dominant is left in the bidding. The revenue will be
smaller per block than when N<D, but it is unclear whether gov-
ernment profits will go lower or higher.
Once risk aversion is taken into account, dominant firms have
an advantage. Since they are likely to have superior information
about the domestic market (because they are likely to be incumbent
firms), they have access to more accurate information than non-
dominant firms. Non-dominant firms will discount their bids by
varying degrees in relation to the perceived quality of a firm's own
information. Two possible outcomes may occur. First, if they
overestimate the winner's curse, underbid, and shave their bids
more than dominant firms, non-dominant firms' probabilities of
winning will decrease. Second, if their information leads them to a
private valuation that is higher than the market value, although
their probabilities of winning the auction increase, the firms are
more likely to suffer the winner's curse. This would further dis-
suade entry unless the number of spectrum rights up for auction
exceeds the number of dominant firms.
As mentioned earlier, government profit maximization is just
one goal of the auction. Given adequate frequency space and a
small number of incumbent firms, the government should auction
more blocks than the number of dominants to counter collusion in
the auction and in the 3G services after-market. Decreasing the
concentration of the services market will complicate the formation
of a seller's cartel by increasing transaction costs. 81
In discussing auction concerns and solutions, governments
should focus on factors that affect the decision to enter the auction.
Governments need to lower entry costs, ensure a profitable in-
vestment from an auction block, and increase the perceived and
actual chance that the non-dominants will win an auction block.
80 This assumes no firms know the rank order of the dominant firms.
81 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 44, 58-61 (1964)
(concluding that there is a positive relation between concentration and price).
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4. AUCTION CONCERNS
There are three major problems commonly discussed by auc-
tion theorists that can markedly affect the outcome of auctions. 82
The first, the winner's curse, involves the overestimation of the
auctioned asset's value and leads to large financial losses for the
winner. Second, the number of participants in an auction may be
the key factor in determining profitability for the government. Fi-
nally, collusion can affect the auction's outcome as well as the effi-
ciency of the 3G services market. The primary focus of this Com-
ment is the last concern, collusion. Auction design can minimize a
government's need to rely on competition law to prevent anticom-
petitive behavior. As such, collusion receives the bulk of the
treatment.
4.1. Winner's Curse
This simple and intuitive concept was first observed in a 1971
oil industry journal describing the unprofitable ventures when oil
companies won Gulf of Mexico drilling rights at an auction.
83
When a firm enters an auction, there are two types of information
asymmetries: private values and common values.84 Private values
are the firm's estimates of its capital stock, labor, and technical
knowledge.85 Common values are estimates of the technical capa-
bilities of the industry, assets, and consumer demand.8 6 Since no
firm currently operates 3G services, all of the exact measurements
are uncertain and contain statistical error. The possible estimations
82 Although theorists also discuss risk aversion, its relevance to this Com-
ment is minimal because it has a minor effect on bids or participation in bidding
unless a descending Dutch auction is used. In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer an-
nounces a high price and lowers it until one bidder accepts the price. See John G.
Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 381, 381-82
(1981). Auction theory literature is quite extensive. For literature guides, see Paul
Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURv. 227 (1999),
available at http://nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/people/klemperer.htm; Eric S.
Maskin & John G. Riley, Auction Theory with Private Values, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 150
(1985); or R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcoN.
Lrr. 699 (1987).
83 See Capen et al., supra note 35, at 641-53 (documenting the winner's curse
for the first time); Robert B. Wilson, Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information,
MGMT. SCi., Mar. 1969, at 446-48.
84 See 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 7,15-16.
85 McMillan, supra note 19, at 132 n.7.
86 Id.
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lie on a statistical distribution.87 If the true, but a priori unknown,
valuation lies within the distribution, the winning high bid has a
positive chance of overbidding the asset's true value.88 The win-
ner's curse refers to the possibility that the winner will lose money
on the venture by overbidding.8 9
Auction participants' fears of falling victim to the winner's
curse make them discount their bids based on the perceived risk of
the winner's curse.90 To this end, increasing information about the
spectrum's true economic value and the information's accuracy re-
duces the possibility and fear of the winner's curse. If the winner's
curse is realized, the market is injured. At a minimum, higher
wireless prices and sub-optimal usage may result and, at worst,
bankruptcy of industry competitors may occur. If the fear of the
winner's curse is overcompensated for in the bids, the bids will be
lower than the actual value of the asset and government revenue is
reduced. Additionally, firms that discount their bids unequally to
avoid the winner's curse may cause a less efficient firm to win the
auction. Firms discount their valuations differently because each
firm discounts based on its belief about the accuracy of its own in-
formation and its own risk aversion to the winner's curse.91
Firms need information on the cost and demand functions of
the 3G wireless market. Even information sharing between bid-
ders would reduce the winner's curse. But information sharing
causes separate problems of collusion. This will be discussed in
Section 4.3.
4.2. The Number of Participants
While the winner's curse results in inefficiently high bids that
may cause the financial ruin of an industry, attracting too few bid-
ders can cause inefficiently low bids and the loss of potential gov-
87 Wilson, supra note 83, at 446-48.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Maria Vagliasindi & Pietro A. Vagliasindi, The Economics of Auctioning and
Related Regulatory Issues: The Economic Viability of the Auction Provision of the Bill
and Alternatives for Direct-to-Home Licenses, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 478
(1997).
91 See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 82, at 719 (discussing how different
risk-aversions to the winner's curse may cause different discounting of bids). But
see Stuart E. Thiel, Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 884, 884-
86 (1988) (displaying evidence that, in repeated games, the discount rate used to
avoid the winner's curse tends towards a standard industry custom rate).
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eminent revenues for taxpayers. Government and private auctions
have been plagued by a low number of participants.92
First, the winner's curse may dissuade marginal potential en-
trants from entering the market. Competition theory often dis-
cusses contestable markets as a check on anticompetitive behav-
ior.93  If profits rise, the market will attract entrants. Thus,
incumbent firms have an incentive to keep prices down to discour-
age entry. Likely entrants are often those in industries similar to
the incumbent firnis.9 4 For wireless services, other high tech com-
munication and information providers, such as cable and fiber op-
tic firms, may be potential entrants. However, the fear of informa-
tional advantages about the value of the spectrum block by
incumbent firms and the possibility of a winner's curse may dis-
suade their entry.
Second, the technology involved in 3G wireless services creates
a situation in which few firms have the ability to operate a 3G net-
work.
Third, bidders do not wish to enter an auction that they expect
to lose.93 The costs of entering an auction are not trivial. The costs
associated with researching the market, developing technology,
and purchasing legal and financial services can be excessive. 96 In a
one asset sale, one dominant firm can dissuade other bidders from
entering. Without the entrance of other bidders, the final sale to
92 See McMillan, supra note 19, at 148 (describing how a winning firm bidding
NZ$7 million paid only NZ$5,000 in a second price sealed bid auction because
only two bids were entered); Bulow & Kiemperer, supra note 36, at 180-96 (show-
ing the value of additional bidders in an ascending auction).
93 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15, §§ 1.321, 3 (discussing likely
entry into the market as a means of ensuring competition); William J. Baumol, De-
terminants of Industry Structure and Contestable Market Theory, in COMPANION TO
CONTEMPORARY EcONOMIc THOUGHT 507, 507-22 (David Greenaway et al. eds.,
1991).
94 See Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Anti-
trust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 178,178-83 (1981).
93 See 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 6-7, 10-11 (discussing deterrence in gen-
eral). As an example, Klemperer presents Glaxo's 1995 takeover of Welcome for
$9 billion. Both Hoffman LaRoche and Zeneca expressed an interest in excess of
$10 billion. However, the expectation of Glaxo's ultimate success kept these bid-
ders away and Welcome's shareholders sold out for nine instead of fourteen bil-
lion dollars. Bidding incurs non-negligible costs on the participants. Estimates
place Glaxo's costs associated with the bidding at $30 million. Id.
96 Id.; cf. Giddy Bidding, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 2000, at 36 ("Add to that the fact
the bidding companies have spent huge sums already on working out how much
a third-generation license is worth to them, and the risk that they are overpaying
to get one looks smaller again.").
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the dominant firm may be at a price lower than the valuation of the
non-participating firms. Their abstention dampens the bids re-
ceived. This is similar to liquid markets. The greater the number
of participants, the more accurate the market clearing price will
be.97
Auction designers need to structure the auction to attract bid-
ders. To prevent the winner's curse from dissuading entry, the
auction or the regulators must provide information about the as-
set's value. Yet, the auctioneers have an interest in reducing the in-
formation given to firms about other firms' valuations of the spec-
trum rights. Auctioneers may even wish to add a bit of
randomness to the auction's outcome to reduce inevitable out-
comes.98 By auctioning several blocks at once, potential bidders
will no longer be dissuaded by one dominant firm. Knowledge as
to the four or five most dominant firms may be more asymmetric.
Potential firms attempting to be the second or even fifth highest
bidder will bid up the price and force the highest bidder to raise its
bid above what it would need to bid in a one block auction. In a
multi-block auction, each spectrum block is a substitute for every
other one. If there is fierce bidding on a block, a bidder may switch
to another lower priced block and drive up its price.99 The domi-
nant firms will be forced to stay above the bidding prices of the
non-dominant firms to secure the blocks that they are expected to
secure. In order to attract bidders and to avoid the winner's curse,
a balance must be struck between providing information on com-
mon values and reducing information on private values.
4.3. Collusion
The harmful effects of attracting too few bidders can be repli-
cated or exaggerated by collusion. Collusion by the bidders de-
presses prices and lowers the government's revenue. Collusion
may also delay the efficient implementation of the market as the
cartel members allocate spectrum rights in the secondary market
for spectrum rights. This anticompetitive behavior threatens both
the 3G auction and the provision of wireless 3G services. Auction
structure must hinder and discourage collusion. The following
97 VARIAN, supra note 40, at 362-64,448-68.
98 1 Klemperer, supra note 28, at 18-19, 19 n.45-46.
99 See Paul Milgrom, Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, 42 EuR. ECON.
REV. 771, 777 (1998) (discussing simultaneous ascending auctions in the United
States).
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Section discusses the factors that facilitate collusion and the struc-
ture of a successful cartel and offers auction recommendations to
attack each element.100
Both tacit and explicit collusion may exist. Explicit collusion is
punishable under EU competition law only after it has occurred.
An oligopoly without collusion is not illegal, but it will cause both
price distortions and above competitive profits. Tacit collusion
produces similar anticompetitive effects to explicit collusion, but
the evidentiary requirements for finding a violation and prevent-
ing the anticompetitive effects of an enjoinable activity necessitates
a different treatment in the law.10 1 The effects of explicit or tacit
collusion and of oligopoly need to be discouraged.10 2
Collusion can influence an auction by lowering prices or, in the
market for 3G wireless services, by raising prices and reducing
output. Auction design is most useful in preventing auction collu-
sion, but may also be helpful in preventing the facilitating factors
of after-auction collusion on the 3G services.
4.3.1. Factors Facilitating Collusion
Certain aspects of a market structure can increase the likeli-
hood of a carteYs formation and stability.103 Facilitating factors are
inherent in the wireless communications industry, but a well-
designed auction can reduce their effects. There are three'0 4 main
collusion-facilitating factors: (1) homogeneity of the auction
blocks; (2) inelastic supply; and (3) the number of bidders.
10 5 The
100 See infra Section 5.3.
101 See Robert F. Lanzillotti, Coming to Terms with Daubert in Sherman Act Com-
plaints: A Suggested Economic Approach, 77 NEB. L. REV. 83, 93 n.27 (1998) (describ-
ing characteristics that predispose a market to price fixing).
102 Compare BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 29-30,44 (arguing that sealed
bids stabilize a cartel), and 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 3-4 (arguing that sealed
bid auctions with multiple items and uniform price increase collusion), with
McMillan, supra note 19, at 152-53 (arguing that multi-round sealed bids reduce
collusion as compared to oral multi-round bidding), and 2 Klemperer, supra note
47, at 4-5, 10 (adding that sealed bid auctions with various prices paid for the
items will attract additional bidders and complicate collusion).
103 See also HANDLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 520-22; RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 287-88 (4th ed. 1992) (listing and characterizing fa-
cilitating factors).
104 Typically, a fourth facilitating factor, industry history, would suit this
Section, but European telecommunications industry competition is in its infancy
and no history of collusion has occurred or been discovered.
105 Most literature on facilitating factors discusses cartels in light of the theory
of monopoly. Auctions are not selling cartels, but buying cartels. Therefore, the
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literature is divided as to whether sealed bids or open bids facili-
tate buying cartels.106
4.3.1.1. Homogeneity
Homogenous products allow a simple agreement on price be-
cause the auction blocks are fungible. 107 One market clearing price
exists. If the good is heterogeneous, the cartel agreement requires
both price and quality agreements, which expands the number of
dimensions on which the cartel must agree. 08
By differentiating the spectrum blocks' quality 09 and band-
width size," 0 the government can create heterogeneity. This will
confuse the cartel. Price cannot be determined by a simple price
per frequency. Larger bandwidths allow a firm to provide more
wireless services."' Each additional service provides increased
economies of sale. Varying the services provided allows for prod-
uct differentiation in the post-auction market. At the same time,
the higher value of larger bandwidth may be unstable because
technical progress may one day allow additional services on the
limited bandwidth of the smaller spectrum blocks. Cartel mem-
structure of a buying cartel seeks to replicate a monopsony. The change of van-
tage point and terminology should be kept in mind, particularly when discussing
inelastic supply.
106 Compare 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 12-13 (arguing in favor of closed
bids), and BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 44, with McMillan, supra note 19, at
151-52 (arguing that open bids reduce collusion and decrease the winner's curse).
107 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 44.
108 Id.; George A. Hay, Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case (1984), in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS 182, 186-87 (John E. Kwoka &
Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed. 1999).
109 The government may offer paired or unpaired spectra. A paired band re-
quires more frequencies but contains two portions. One portion sends informa-
tion to the user while the other simultaneously sends information back. An un-
paired band uses less frequency space, but leads to slower service, as the band
must switch back and forth between upstream and downstream data traffic. See
U.K. RADIOCOMMUNIcATIONS AGENCY, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: AUCTION OF
LICENSES FOR UK THIRD GENERATION MOBILE SPECTRUM D.126, D.132 (2000), at
http://www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/3gindex.htm; Ericsson, 3G Glossary, at
http://www.ericsson.com/3g/glossary.shtml (last visited Jan. 13,2002).
110 See id.; Sidenbladh, Current Status of 3G Licensing, supra note 6.
111 Various uses for 3G wireless services have been recommended: phone,
video, fax, data, internet, game devices, etc. See Peter Landers, Dick Tracy, Meet
'3G', WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, at B1 (showing examples of 3G devices); Ericsson
Australia, Third Generation Mobile Systems (same), at http://www.ericsson.com
/3g/terminals/index.shtml.
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bers would need to agree on a complicated pricing scheme and as-
sign each individual block to a certain cartel member.
4.3.1.2. Inelastic Supply"
2
Third Generation rights are perfectly inelastic" 3 because the
government sets a fixed quantity of rights to disperse. Regardless
of how low the winning bids are, the government will be selling
the same number of 3G blocks. The cartel needs only decide on
price and not quantity purchased. The cartel members cannot de-
fect from the cartel by purchasing a greater number of blocks. This
simplification facilitates the creation and performance of the cartel.
Collusion will increase the already above competitive prices
caused by the inelastic supply of spectrum rights."
4
The auction structure can reduce the effect of collusion by util-
izing a reservation price." 5 A cartel may still be successful by
paying only the reservation price, but the damages will be miti-
gated. The reservation price will be set low to attract bidders. If
inaccurate information causes the government to set the price too
high, bidders will be dissuaded from entering the auction. The
reservation price will be deliberately discounted to attract bidders.
4.3.1.3. Number of Bidders
The fewer the number of bidders, the lower the transaction
costs associated with organizing and monitoring the cartel."
6
There are few firms that have access to significant capital and pos-
sess the technical ability to purchase a 3G block and operate a 3G
service." 7 But the inelastic supply means the cartel must organize
so that the membership equals the number of auction blocks.
Firms will form joint ventures to reduce the number of bidders
without excluding members. The cartel must incorporate enough
112 Inelastic demand facilitates the founding of a seller cartel. See McGee, in-
fra note 138, at 197.
113 When a commodity is inelastic, a change in the price has little effect on
supply. A commodity is perfectly inelastic when supply stays constant regardless
of price. See VARIAN, supra note 40, at 265-75.
114 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 44.
115 See McMillan, supra note 19, at 148.
116 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 43; cf. Hay, supra note 108, at 196-
97 (discussing market concentration among oligopoly sellers).
117 Cf. McGee, infra note 138, at 197 (associating the number of bidders with
low transaction costs to organize cartel behavior and facilitate its founding).
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members to include all firms with the willingness, capital, and
technical knowledge to purchase a block.
To attack this, the auction rules should prevent joint ventures
from bidding. Competition law can be used to police pre-auction
mergers, but the EU may not wish to use this preventative
method.118 By preventing joint ventures, each individual firm must
bid to ensure involvement in the 3G market.ll 9 Because there is an
inelastic supply of spectrum rights, joint ventures should be the
greatest cause for concern to government auctioneers in 3G wire-
less auctions.
4.3.1.4. Industny History
Industries that have experienced collusion in the past are likely
to repeat such behavior.120 The relatively recent deregulation of the
European telecommunications industry means that collusive be-
havior among such firms is unlikely. The EU now allows cross-
border telecommunication activity and prevents member states
from denying foreign competitors access to their markets. History
is not a facilitating factor because the European wireless services
industry is relatively new.
Still, to prevent incumbents from colluding at auction, the auc-
tion should encourage the entry of new participants. As discussed
below, the U.K. partitioned its auction by reserving one block (the
highest quality block) for ownership by a new entrant and compli-
cated the formation of a cartel.
4.4. Requirements for Successful Explicit Collusion
An agreement, a monitoring system, and a sanctioning system
are the three key ingredients for a successful cartel. Competition
law tries to prevent the existence of all three ingredients. Europe's
118 WHISH & SuFRIN, supra note 11, at 702-29 (detailing the EU's pre-merger
regulatory regime); see also discussion infra Section 5.1.
119 A counterargument can be made to the use of such a strategy. Auction
rings are discussed below and provide a traditional reason for members not to
participate in a government auction.
120 See Viscusi, supra note 38, at 121-22 (discussing Robert Porter's case study
of railroad collusion in the 1880s); Lanzillotti, supra note 101, at 102-08 (providing
an empirical study displaying the solidification and increased success of duopo-
lists in school milk contract auctions in the Cleveland area). See generally RICHARD
B. TENNANT, THE AMERICAN CIGARETTE INDUSTRY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1950) (chronicling the history of collusion in the cigarette in-
dustry).
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wireless auctions need to hinder agreement and monitoring, but
should encourage sanctioning.
4.4.1. Agreement
At the most basic level, spectrum bandwidth is fungible. Cartel
members can either agree which member will purchase each block
or decide on the bids to offer.121 Because there is perfect inelasticity
of supply, setting price and setting quantity cause the same result.
The fixed supply forces one of three types of cartel structure. The
firms will create joint ventures, organize an auction ring, or engage
in bid rigging.
4.4.1.1. Joint Ventures
Because of the inelastic supply of spectrum blocks, a price-
fixing cartel cannot include the entire industry. Instead of allocat-
ing the quantity of items exchanged, the cartel will organize the
number of competitors. The cartel will use joint ventures and
mergers to fix the number of cartel members to be no larger than
the number of blocks up for auction. The cartel must ensure that
the final number of dominant firms is less than or equal to the
number of auction blocks.
Auction rules cannot simply block all joint ventures. Some
joint ventures may have procompetitive effects.122 Mergers and
joint ventures may be evidence of the complexity of the industry
and the need for capital accumulation, cross-products, customer
information, and technical expertise. 23
121 In an ascending bid auction, the cartel will set a price ceiling. In a first or
uniform price sealed bid auction, the members will set an exact price. In a second
price sealed bid auction, known as a Vickery auction, one cartel member's bid will
approach infinity while the other members' bids will approach zero or the reser-
vation price. The highest bidder will win the auction block and pay the second
highest price. McMillan, supra note 19, at 147-48.
122 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, art. 85(3) (allowing procompetitive ex-
emptions from horizontal agreements); Regulation 4064/89, supra note 13 (allow-
ing approval of procompetitive mergers and joint ventures that support the con-
cept of a unitary European market); Patrick Del Duca & Duccio Mortillaro, The
Maturation of Italy's Response to European Community Law: Electric and Telecommuni-
cation Sector Institutional Innovations, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 536, 560-602 (2000) (de-
scribing the requirements for the EU Commission to find a procompetitive ex-
emption under Article 85(3)); see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 15,
§ 4 (allowing approval of procompetitive mergers and joint ventures).
123 See Melpomeni Styliadou, Applying EC Competition Law to Alliances in the
Telecommunications Sector, 21 TELECOM. POL'x 47 (1997) (analyzing telecom joint
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Legitimate procompetitive joint ventures and mergers may fa-
cilitate the coordination of tacit collusion or serve as circumstantial
evidence of an explicit cartel. Both reduce the number of bidders
in the auction and can depress prices.
Auction rules against joint ventures or mergers may, at worst,
be adverse to the goals of the auction. Joint ventures and mergers
may reduce the number of telecommunications firms but may in-
crease the number of firms capable of winning an auction because
of accumulation of capital. The low revenues raised in the Dutch
3G auction have been blamed on the approved joint venture be-
tween KPN, the former Dutch monopoly phone company, and
three of the largest potential entrants, Deutsche Telekom, DoCoMo
and Hutchinson.124 Since there were five dominant domestic firms,
several other dominant firms likely to enter, and five spectrum
blocks up for auction, the cartel needed to reduce the number of
bidders to five. The Dutch auction had low prices because the
eight cartel members organized as five independent actors. 125
Auction theory may have to rely on competition law's regula-
tory structure of monitoring mergers and joint ventures. Joint
ventures between telecommunications companies fall within the
scope of Article 85.126 Mergers between telecommunications and
non-telecommunications companies are regulated under the
MTF.127 Mergers under Article 85 have been given lenient exemp-
tions because of economic and political concerns, while MTF merg-
ers and "concentrative joint ventures" have been given closer scru-
tiny.128 Unfortunately, the EU and the MTF more readily allow
mergers that pose the greatest possibility for collusive behavior.
Relying on joint venture and merger regulation adds an extra
step that can cause delay in the auction and allows joint ventures
between dominant and experienced firms. Auctioneers in the in-
dividual countries must bar large-firm joint ventures in the auction
ventures approved by the EU for their procompetitive effects in a complicated,
competitive, and ever-changing sector).
124 Paul Klemperer, The Flaws of a Dutch Auction, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at
19 [hereinafter Klemperer, Flaws].
125 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 20; Klemperer, Flaws, supra note 124, at 19.
126 Styliadou, supra note 123, at 48-49.
127 Id. at 49.
128 Id. at 49-50, 55, 57-58.
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rules and rely on EU oversight only as a backup.129 EU and do-
mestic competition authority oversight may be the only way to
prevent cartels where members refrained from competitive bid-
ding during the auction but agreed to form mergers or joint ven-
tures after the auction. If the EU and domestic authorities give rig-
orous oversight of wireless concentration after the auction and if
this stringency is known ex ante, then cartels may be prevented.
Alternatively, the auction rules may specifically restrict transfer-
ability of the assets for a period of time unless market conditions
change or bankruptcy of a winning firm occurs.
4.4.1.2. Auction Rings
Auction rings agree that only one member will bid to win each
auction block.13° The auction ring later holds a second auction
amongst itself.131 The illicit profits from the second auction are
distributed among the cartel members. 32 Auction rings still allo-
cate the spectrum blocks to the most efficient winner. However,
the ring causes a wealth transfer from the government to the auc-
tion ring and delays the implementation of 3G services. There are
two ways an auction can prevent auction rings. First, the rules
should bar the transferability of the rights to another firm for a set
period of time. Second, the rules must prevent the monitoring
system needed by the cartel to detect cartel defection.
4.4.1.3. Bid Rigging
Bid rigging supports collusion in the after-market. 133 Major
bidders will fix their bids to ensure that each member pays the
129 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 10, 17-18 (noting the detrimental effect of
large-firm joint ventures on the Swiss 3G auction, and arguing for more strict
government oversight).
130 Kathryn M. Fenton, Antitrust Counseling on Group Buying Issues,
ANTTRmusr, Spring 1998, at 23, 23 (citing United States v. Seville Indus. Mach.
Corp., 696 F. Supp. 986,989-90 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding a per se violation of Sherman
Act § 1 when firms formed an agreement not to bid competitively at a bankruptcy
auction and then held a later auction)).
131 Fenton, supra note 130, at 23.
132 Id.
133 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 28-31. Blair and Harrison describe the
bid rigging at issue in American Tobacco Co. v. United States. The "Big Three" of
the American tobacco market fixed prices at tobacco leaf auctions. The companies
would only bid on tobacco leaf if the other members were present and all three
would pay the same prices. This harmonized cigarette production costs and fa-
cilitated a price-fixing cartel. The anticompetitive behavior depressed auction
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same price.134 The price may or may not be determined ex ante,
but the members' bids stay in lockstep with each other.135 This is
meant to simplify collusion in the 3G services market' 36 rather than
in the auction. By fixing the input price of the spectrum blocks, a
seller cartel can monitor each member's cost structure more easily
and therefore fix the sales price more easily. Bid rigging becomes a
facilitating factor of a larger explicit cartel. Bid rigging does not
depress the prices of an individual auction.
Because the 3G auction will occur once and is a not a repeated
series of auctions, 137 all members of the cartel will be present for
the 3G auction. Therefore, depressed prices will not occur and
government revenue will not be injured. Spectrum rights will be
allocated to the most efficient firms because any successful bid rig-
ging scheme includes them.
However, the auction will facilitate later collusion. To this end,
the auction must still prevent bid rigging from creating a future fa-
cilitating factor. Avoiding bid rigging requires the auction rules to
prevent the monitoring system and encourage a sanctioning sys-
tem.
4.4.2. Monitoring
The cartel requires a monitoring system to prevent cheating
and the loss of the cartel's illicit benefits.138 In a standard buying
cartel, an individual firm has an incentive to expand its purchas-
prices when less than all of the members were present. The removal of the other
two from bidding at other auctions lowered the prices farmers received for to-
bacco leaf while increasing the price consumers paid for cigarettes. See also Am.
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814-15 (1946) (holding that the "Big
Three" conspired to establish a monopoly).
134 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 28-31; Leonard W. Weiss, The Concen-
tration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw
LEARNING 184, 189-90 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
135 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 28-31.
136 Id.
137 The licenses are for twenty years. After that, license renewal may be a
forgone conclusion or another auction may be required. Either way, members
will view the auction as a one-time transaction.
138 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 45 (citing Kenneth G. Elzinga, New
Developments on the Cartel Front, ANTITRUST BULL., Spring 1984, at 3, 3-26); John S.
McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. Ci.
L. REV. 191, 198-201 (1960) (discussing the monitoring behavior of a cartel and the
rise in costs associated with a rise in the number of participants).
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ing.139 This increases demand and price. The benefits of the cartel
are diminished.
Due to the inelastic supply of bandwidth in 3G auctions, ex-
pansion of the quantity purchased will not occur. Cheating entails
raising prices above the agreed-upon price or bidding on a spec-
trum block not assigned to that firm. The specific type of cheating
depends on the type of cartel organized. Cheating in bid rigging is
caused when bids are non-identical and the costs of the inputs are
changed. Joint venture and merger defection occurs when the joint
ventures or mergers collapse and the number of bidders increases,
which in turn drives up prices towards the competitive level.
Defection in an auction ring may occur in several ways. The
members who agreed to leave the auction early (or not participate
at all) may remain in the auction and submit potentially winning
bids. Alternatively, those members assigned to win the govern-
ment auction may refuse to participate in the agreed after-market,
or they may bid on a block not assigned to them.
To monitor joint venture and merger defections, the cartels
need only follow the business press. Because this type of cartel or-
ganizes by fixing the number of bidders rather than sellers, the
auction design cannot prevent monitoring. Defection would occur
before the auction even begins. To monitor defections in auction
rings and in bid rigging, the cartels must observe the bids and the
identity of which participants made which bids.140 No other
monitoring device can be used effectively during an auction.' 41
First, to prevent the monitoring system, the auction should
utilize sealed bids. Defection will be more likely among auction
rings and bid rigging cartels because the identity of the defector
will be protected. Non-bidding members of an auction ring will be
able to bid without discovery until the spectrum blocks are allo-
cated to the winning bidders. The bidding members will be able to
139 McGee, supra note 138, at 202.
140 An alternative would be a monitoring of capital accumulation or credit
options by participating firms as a proxy measure of their bids. This is a poor
substitute for observing the bids; accumulation of capital or credit options may be
ways of scaring off non-cartel member competition. Alternatively, capital accu-
mulation could be for use in other ventures. Telecommunications companies tend
to be complex entities operating in several geographic and product markets, and
such activity in the financial markets may be for other ventures.
141 Traditional selling or buying cartels can monitor market prices, market or
individual sales (quantity), or input purchases (a proxy for production quantity).
Because there is a fixed number of spectrum blocks, the only action that can be
taken by the firms is their bid.
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bid on a block they preferred but were not assigned to by the auc-
tion ring. For the bid rigging cartel, the members will not know
the exact price paid by each member. This will cause differentiated
input prices and make the formation of a seller cartel in the 3G
services market more difficult.
Second, once sealed bids are used, participants will use alter-
native means of identifying themselves. One common communi-
cation method during multi-round auctions is to use the numbers
in the bids to signal a player's identity. For instance, in the U.S.
PCS auctions, GTE submitted bids ending in the digits 438, which
spells out GTE on a telephone keypad. Auctions can easily avoid
this by rounding all bids to a standard bid increment. Bidders will
constantly attempt to use alternative signaling devices in the bid-
ding and auction designers will need to monitor for new methods.
Third, to reduce the information disseminated, only the highest
bids of any one round should be announced. In this way, a signal
based on the amount bid will not appear in each and every round.
This allows a defecting firm to remove its signal, thus implying a
lower bid or a defection from the cartel.
4.4.3. Sanctioning42
In any of the three types of buying cartels, sanctioning defec-
tion will include the reversion to independent action and competi-
tive prices. Sanctioning auction defection may also result in a tra-
ditional sanctioning143 action in the 3G services market, or in the
prevention of the formation of a later 3G market cartel. In a nor-
mal selling cartel, sanctioning commonly includes periods of
predatory pricing to force the reformation of the cartel.144 In an
auction, predatory behavior would constitute higher than optimal
bids and inevitably lead to a winner's curse. Because the auction is
142 For examples of seller cartel sanctioning, see William B. Burnett, Predation
by a Nondominant Firm: The Liggett Case (1993), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, su-
pra note 108, passim (comparing single firm predatory pricing to sanction defec-
tion); and Kenneth G. Elzinga, Collusive Predation: Matsushita v. Zenith (1986), in
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 108, at 229 (analyzing collusive predatory
behavior).
143 For example, sanctions for temporary predatory pricing, refusals to deal,
or refusal to enter a future seller cartel.
144 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 243-51 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown had engaged in
temporary predatory pricing against Liggett (Brooke Group) in the generic ciga-
rette market until Liggett returned to the cartel practice of bi-annual price raises).
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a one-time145 event with a fixed number of auction blocks,146 the
sanctioning system cannot contain predatory behavior during the
auction.
The auction rules aim to encourage defection so that the sanc-
tion will result. The government's goals are fulfilled by a competi-
tive auction.
5. RELEVANT EU COMPETITION LAW
European competition law 4 7 and its enforcement by the EU
148
are the central focal points of the following discussion. Although
this paper discusses events that occurred in the U.K., Germany,
and Italy, analyzing each state's competition law would be outside
the scope of this paper and would focus unintended attention on
those systems at the expense of other European systems. Addi-
tionally, an analysis of each individual country's competition law
would be redundant after a discussion of EU competition law. The
majority of Europe's national competition laws, both of members
of the EU and of countries waiting to join, mirror the EU's compe-
tition laws.149 Further, the EU is now decentralizing competition
145 If an auction occurs on a regular basis, like for construction contracts or
government treasury bonds, the cartel may be more stable. Predatory action may
occur in the next round or several rounds before the cartel is reformed. See 1
Klemperer, supra note 28, at 29 (describing a U.S. Treasury auction cartel solidified
by repeated play); Lanzillotti, supra note 101, at 102-08.
146 Normally when predatory pricing occurs, output increases as the price
drops. This causes losses on all firms in the market Because the 3G spectrum
auctions have an inelastic supply of blocks and a homogeneous product, preda-
tory behavior will only effect the price and cannot effect quantity or quality.
147 For a text on Competition Law in Europe and the U.K., see generally
WHISH & SUFRUN, supra note 11. The Italian competition law is in its infancy, dat-
ing back to only 1990, and it mirrors EU competition law. See DAVID J. GERBER,
LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS
408-10 (1998).
148 The Treaty of Rome did not establish a structure for enforcing the compe-
tition law provisions. Later European Council regulation provided an institu-
tional structure. The initial regulations required national governments to cease a
competition law investigation or prosecution under the competition laws if the
EU began an investigation. This provided national governments with grave dis-
incentives to begin investigations or to take competition law enforcement seri-
ously. See Council Regulation 17 the First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 &
86 of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. 13/204 (establishing the original procedures for the EEC
to enforce Treaty of Rome articles 85 and 86).
149 Henriette Tielemans et al., Proposed Reforms of EC Competition Law,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 65, 66; see also GERBER, supra note 147, at 392-416 (discuss-
ing the recent trend towards convergence of national competition laws towards
the EU model). For example, Italian competition law specifically references EU
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law;150 the EU is shifting much of competition law prosecution
from the EU courts to the member state court systems.'5 ' As such,
member states will enforce EU competition law instead of their
domestic competition law. 52 This account is only meant to pro-
vide a limited overview of EU competition law as it relates to this
Comment.5 3
5.1. Collusion
EU competition law prohibits collusion on prices, quantities, or
in any form that distorts competition. 54 This includes buyer and
seller cartels.,5  Collusion may be tacit or explicit. Both require a
cartel to: (1) affect price, output, or distort competition; (2) monitor
member behavior; and (3) sanction cartel defectors. Explicit collu-
sion involves an illegal agreement such as the recent Christie's and
Sotheby's price fixing agreement. In the EU, explicit cartel agree-
ments are found to have as their objective 5 6 a distortion of compe-
tition.
157
competition law and states the statute "shall be interpreted in accordance with the
principles of the European Community competition law." Competition and Fair
Trading Act, Gazz. Uff. No. 240, Law No. 287 of 10 Oct 1990, § 1.4 (Italy), available
at http://www.agcm.it/eng/tema0151.htm; see id. § 1.1.
150 EUROPEAN COMM'N, WHITE PAPER ON MODERNISATION OF THE RuLES
IMPLEMENTING ARTS. 85 & 86 OF THE EC TREATY, Comm'n Programme No. 99/027,
v. 28.04.1999, at 20-21, 30-36, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/antitrust/wbmodernisation.en.pdf/.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 32-37.
153 For a general overview of competition law, see CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY &
GRAHAM CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION (5th ed. 2001); SIMON
BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE EcONOMIcS OF EC COMPETITION LAW (1999); WHISH &
SUFRIN, supra note 11. For a more general overview of the historical development
of European competition law, see GERBER, supra note 147, at 334-416.
154 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, art. 85; see also Commission Notice of 6
January 2001 of Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, § 4, paras. 115-38, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2 (describ-
ing enforcement guidelines against buyer cartels and the correct interpretation of
Article 85(1)). Like the Sherman Act, Articles 85 and 86 were brief and their func-
tion was to provide the basic law that would be given content in practice. See
GERBER, supra note 147, at 344-45.
155 MARTIN COLEMAN & MICHAEL GRENFELL, THE COMPETITION ACT 1998: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 7.11 (1999); WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 396 n.7, 409.
156 This is analogous to finding an action per se illegal under the Sherman
A&. See WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 16-20, 203-07.
157 See id. at 203-07.
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Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome requires an "agreement" to
find a competition violation.'- "Agreement" has been read expan-
sively by the Court of Justice of the European Communities
("ECJ") to include "concerted practices"15 9 and not just explicit oral
or written agreements. Basic microeconomic theory suggests that
oligopoly markets tend to have higher prices and reduced out-
put.160 The distinction between the natural consequences of oli-
gopoly and the illegal consequences of concerted action is shown
via a continuum rather than by a bright line rule. Firm behavior
may be parallel or similar, but must be independently reached by
each firm. Inefficiencies are the natural result of an oligopoly mar-
ket, but can be exaggerated by tacit collusion. This exaggeration
would be the result of concerted practice by the cartel. The parties
can tacitly agree by exhibiting repeated behavior that is commonly
described by a repeated prisoner's dilemma game.161 When there
are few firms, there are fewer organizational problems for the car-
tel.' 62 This, in turn, means less evidence for prosecutors. Yet, mar-
kets with few competitors have the power to form the most egre-
gious anticompetitive cartels through tacit parallel behavior.
Without the concerted practices doctrine, the most successful car-
tels would go unpunished. 63
It is difficult to establish the line between independent action
and tacit collusion. 64 Prosecution of tacit collusion relies on cir-
153 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 3, art 85(1); WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11,
at 191-92.
159 Concerted practices are a broad category of cooperative actions between
firms that fall short of an outright agreement. Proving a concerted practice re-
quires direct or indirect evidence of cooperation that is substituted for actual
competition. No definitive line separates agreements from concerted practices;
both lie on a spectrum of behavior. WI-sH & SuFRIN, supra note 11, at 191-92, 195-
97.
160 Markets with few competitors are susceptible to higher-than competitive
prices, even when the competitors act independently. For a basic analysis of
Cournot and Bertrand duopoly, see HAL R. VARIAN, MIcROEcONOMIc ANALYSIS
285-301 (3d ed. 1992). Oligopoly theory is an extension of the basic Cournot and
Bertrand duopoly. Id.
161 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 165-67 (1994);
GIBBONS, supra note 78, at 88-100.
162 See BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 153, at 80-81.
163 Id.
164 See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655,663-66 (1962) (noting
the difficulty in distinguishing independent profit maximizing firm behavior in an
oligopoly market from tacit or explicit agreement to increase profits by concerted
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cumstantial evidence of parallel behavior.165 Because an industry
with few firms may normally have higher than competitive prices
and profits, observed parallel behavior may or may not rise to the
level of knowing intent to collude. The European Commission has
been overturned several times by the ECJ or Court of First Instance
("CFI")166 when the courts found insufficient proof of concerted
practices.167 The ECJ has stated that procompetitive or alternative
explanations can refute a finding that parallel behavior proves a
concerted practice.168 There are several explanations for why the
Court places a high burden of proof on the Commission. Many
concerted practices contain no enjoinable activities or agreements.
Concerted practices may not involve any illicit behavior (mens rea)
aside from independent profit maximizing and competitive be-
havior.169 The courts are unable to prevent future behavior if no
enjoinable activity has taken place.
action); see also BAIRD, supra note 161, at 166 (discussing models of collusion and
parallel behavior in repeated games in relation to antitrust laws).
165 See WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 197-99 (discussing the proof required
by the CFI and Eq in Article 85(1) cases).
166 The CFI was established in 1989 to aid the heavy case load burden on the
ECJ. In September 1989, the CFI began to hear appeals from Commission compe-
tition law cases under Arts. 85 and 86. (State aid in violation of competition laws
may be directly appealed to the ECJ.) The ECJ now hears appeals from the CFI in
competition cases on points of law but not of fact. See WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note
11, at 33.
167 See Joined Cases T-79/89 etc., Re the PVC Cartel: BASF AG and Others v.
Commission, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (1992) (finding by the CFI that the Commis-
sion failed to prove concerted action); Case 29-30/83, Compagnie Royale Asturi-
enne des Mines S.A. & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission, [1985] 42 C.M.L.R. 688
(1984) (finding by the ECJ that parallel behavior can be circumstantial evidence of
concerted action, but is not conclusive when alternative explanations account for
the behavior).
168 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446 (1999) (preliminary ruling) (citing Commis-
sion Notice Concerning Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in the
Field of Co-Operation between Enterprises, 1968 O.J. (C 84) 14); see also EUR.
COMM'N, 14th Annual Report on Competition Policy, point 126 (1994).
169 Professor Turner concludes that:.
Conscious parallelism is meaningless, and in no way indicates agree-
ment, in the absence of some evidence indicating that the parallel deci-
sions of the alleged conspirators were contrary, on the hypothesis of in-
dependent individual decision, to their apparent individual self-interest.
Conscious parallelism contains no element of agreement where what is
involved is simply the independent responses of a group of competitors
to the same set of facts, "independent" decision meaning a decision that
would have been taken regardless of what competitors decided to do.
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EU competition law has been successfully used against collu-
sive behavior by auction participants. In the European Sugar Indus-
try case, the Commission found that several different industry
practices were incompatible with the Community.170 In the Italian
sugar market, the sugar producer cartel colluded on a tender sys-
tem. The domestic Italian sugar producers could not adequately
supply the Italian market.171 The Italian authorities devised a ten-
der system for other EU sugar producers to supply the domestic
sugar producers with adequate quantities to supply the Italian
market. 72 This insulated the Italian market from foreign competi-
tion by preventing foreign competitors from directly supplying
wholesalers or retailers.173 French, Belgian, and German producers
with excess sugar were forced to sell their sugar to their Italian
competitors instead of entering the market directly. 7 4 The French
and Belgian producers organized their tender offers through one
company, Sucres et Denrees, so that one price would be submit-
ted. 75 Additionally, the French, Belgian, and German producers
divided the quantities they would provide to the Italians through a
quota system before submitting their bids. 7 6 All of these activities
were held to be violations of Article 85. This decision established
that Article 85 covered collusion among bidders in a tender offer.
More recently, in Building and Construction Industnj in the Neth-
erlands, the Commission extended its review of bidder behavior to
other common anticompetitive behavior. 177 Twenty-eight inde-
pendent construction associations formed the Statutes of the Ver-
eniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de
Bouwnijverheid ("SPO") to regulate contractor bids on tender of-
Turner, supra note 164, at 681-82.
170 Commission Decision 73/109/EEC of 2 Jan. 1974 Relating to Proceedings
Under Arts. 85 & 86 of the EEC Treaty (Case IV/26-918, European Sugar Indus-
try), 1973 Oj. (L 140) 17 [hereinafter European Sugar Industry].
171 Id. § I.A.7.
172 Id. § II.A.2.
173 Id. § Il.A.
174 Id. § II.A.2.
175 European Sugar Industry, supra note 170, § II.A.2.
176 Id. § II.A.2.
177 Commission Decision 92/204/EEC of 5 Feb. 1992 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (Case IV/31.572 & 32571 Building and
Construction Industry in the Netherlands), 1992 O.J. (L 92) 1 (only Dutch text
authentic) [hereinafter Building and Construction Industry].
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fers for construction jobs.178 When a tender offer is promulgated
by a client, the SPO arranges for the construction companies to
meet before the bids are submitted. 79 The meetings are overseen
by an SPO employee/chairman. The participants then decide by a
majority vote on the "entitled undertaking" -the sole contractor
allowed to negotiate with the client. 80 The contractors then dis-
cuss relevant "technical and economic" data.18' After this discus-
sion, each contractor tells the chairman his intended tender price.
The chairman then announces the result to the participants. 182 This
decides which contractor will ultimately win the tender at the ac-
tual auction, but it will not be at the price that the contractor sub-
mitted to the chairman. Instead, the price is subject to certain per-
centage price increases based on the average tender price
submitted. The price increases compensate the SPO and the other
contractors for their participation. 183 This case more clearly defines
competition law in competitive tenders to match traditional hori-
zontal collusive behavior. European Sugar Industny involved out-
right price fixing and market division. Building and Construction
Industry in the Netherlands demonstrates that the Commission will
also take action against information sharing and anticompetitive
behavior that falls just short of overt price fixing.
Building and Construction Industny in the Netherlands neverthe-
less shows a basic reason why optimal auction design is needed in
3G auctions. The sheer volume of evidence provided by elaborate
meetings and bylaws of the SPO does not actually reveal a very ef-
ficient cartel. Instead, the evidence shows the difficulty of running
a cartel with 4,200 individual contractors organized into twenty-
eight associations. The vast number of participants requires an
elaborate monitoring and sanctioning system, which the SPO pro-
vides. Third Generation auctions involve very few participants.
Microeconomic theory suggests that this market would not need
an elaborate sanctioning and monitoring system, nor does it need
an explicit agreement to function as a cartel. There would simply
be less evidence for the Commission to gather to prove a conspir-
acy.
178 Id. §§ I.A.-.B.
179 Id. § I.D.a.
180 Id. § I.D.b.
181 Id.
182 Building and Construction Industry, supra note 177, § I.D.b.
183 Id. § I.D.b.(6).
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5.2. An Anticompetitive Practice Left Legal by EU Competition Law
Lastly, and most importantly, EU competition law may not
even consider all anticompetitive behavior in 3G auctions to be il-
legal. As discussed in more detail in Sections 3 and 4, there are
two types of anticompetitive auction behavior. In addition to buy-
ers' collusive behavior, limited block auctions create an incentive
for bidders to merge or form joint ventures before the auction
starts. Government asset auctions, like the 3G auctions, have a set
number of auction blocks. For example, Country X tenders three
3G licenses. If there are initially four bidders, it would be advanta-
geous for two of the bidders to form a joint venture. That way,
there would be three bidders for three licenses, and therefore no
reason to bid over the reserve price.
In competitive tenders, the competitors do not compete in a
market for sales. Instead, they compete in an auction for the mar-
ket. If they win a license, they can participate in the 3G services
market. If they do not, they are completely out of the market. In
traditional mergers, DG Comp and the Commission look to entry,
market shares, market structure, and the HHI index to determine
whether the merger will significantly reduce competition.184 In a
bidding market, market shares may not truly represent a firm's
power.185 The presence of even small market share firms in an
auction can significantly affect the sale price by driving up the bid-
ding.186
The EU is quite receptive to the unique characteristics of bid-
ding markets and has approved mergers that would normally raise
competition concerns under the H--I index test. In SNECMA/FI
Group, the Commission allowed SNECMA and TI to form a joint
184 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 22 Sept. 1999 Declaring a Concentration
to be Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case No.
IV/M.1524-Airtours/First Choice) (only English text official) (exemplifying the
EU merger control's use of entry analysis, market share, market concentration and
the FHI index), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/
cases /decisions/m1524_en.pdf; Commission Decision of 3 Apr. 1999, Applying
Regulation 4064/89 (Case 399M1365 FCC/Vivendi) (only Spanish text authentic)
(discussing the same analysis as above), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/.
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1365_es.pdf; Regulation 4064/89, supra
note 13, arts. 2,3.
195 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 153, § 13.06.
186 Id. § 13.02.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
venture to produce airplane landing gear.187 The approval of this
joint venture reduced the number of competitors in the market
from four to three, leaving one European and two American com-
panies in the market. The airplane landing gear supply market is
similar to a 3G auction. When a supplier bids for a contract with a
manufacturer, the supplier submits both a design proposal and a
price. Once the contract is awarded, the supplier becomes the sole
supplier for that type of aircraft and the manufacturer may not
turn to another supplier. The Commission believed that a reduc-
tion from four to three competitors would not change the market,
because of the presence of the two American competitors.188
In Mercedes-Benz/Kssbohrer, the Commission allowed a merger
that reduced the number of bus manufacturers competing in Ger-
many from four to three 89 It also allowed Mercedes-Benz to cre-
ate a dominant position in Germany. The Commission noted that
bus supply tenders are open to all community manufacturers.190
Therefore, the high market share of Mercedes-Benz and the high
market concentration are not representative of the power small
firms have in auctions.
The Mercedes-Benz/Kdssbohrer decision combines the contestable
market theory and the political element of EU competition law.
The contestable market theory allows for potential competitors to
be taken into account because if the market begins to exhibit rising
profit margins, new competitors will be encouraged to enter the
market.191 This will, in turn, restore the competitive market. The
political element refers to the EU's market integration goals. Mario
Monti, EU Commissioner for Competition, stated that competition
policy-and specifically merger control-must be enforced to en-
courage pan-European integration.192 The Commission has al-
187 Non-opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case No. IV/M.368-
SNECMA/TI Group) 1994 O.J. (C 42) 12; BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 153, §
13.11.
188 Id.
189 Commission Decision 95/354 of 14 Feb. 1995 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 (Case IV/M.477-Mercedes-
Benz/Kissbohrer) 1995 O.J. (L 211) 1 (only German text official) [hereinafter Mer-
cedes-Benz/K~ssbohrer].
190 Id. para. 106.
191 WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 11-12.
192 Commissioner Mario Monti, Remarks at the EC Merger Control 10th An-
niversary Conference on the Main Challenges for a New Decade of EC Merger
Control (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/
cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=-gt&doc=SPEECH/00/311 10 I RAPID&lg=EN.
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lowed normally anticompetitive mergers to be consummated if
they form pan-European corporations.193
Mergers by the bidding firms'ga in 3G tender offers may be
similarly outside the reach of EU competition law. If the EU con-
tinues to give deference to bidding market mergers because of: (1)
the number of competitors mattering more than their market con-
centrations; (2) a contestable market theory; or (3) political and
economic integration promotion, then one of the gravest anticom-
petitive dangers in 3G auctions will go unregulated. In this area,
auction design is not only the most efficient preventative measure
against anticompetitive behavior, it is the only preventative meas-
ure.
If only a few firms decide to compete in an auction, the EU will
approve a joint venture under the contestable market theory and
permit the numerous wireless or telecommunications companies to
participate in the current or the next 3G auction if they wish. After
all, the EU would note that 3G license tenders are open to all EU
member state telecommunications companies, and the market may
be defined as the entire list of wireless and telecommunications
firms.195 Under this pan-European market definition, the merger
for Country X's auction would not be a market contraction from
four to three firms, but, for example, from thirty to twenty-nine
European firms that are capable of participating in the auction.
Under this market definition, the merger would not strengthen or
create a dominant position (or significantly alter the HHI).
193 Compare Commission Decision of 14 March 2000 Declaring a Concentra-
tion to be Incompatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA
Agreement (Case No. COMP/M.1672 Volvo/Scania) (only English text official)
(denying the proposed merger when it created a dominant position in five of fif-
teen member states and combined two Scandinavian based companies), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m167
2 _
en.pdf/, with Commission Decision of I Sept. 2000 Declaring a Concentration to
be Compatible with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.1980-3 Volvo/Renault)
2000 O.J. (C 301) 23 [hereinafter Volvo/Renault] (approving a merger despite cre-
ating a dominant position in four of fifteen member states because it was a pan-
European merger creating a Swedish-French corporation).
194 See supra Sections 4.3.1.3., 4.4.1.1.
193 Cf. Mercedes-Benz/K<ssbohrer, supra note 189 (defining the geographic
market for potential abuse as Germany, but discussing the supply-side substitutes
as a Europe wide market); Volvo/Renault, supra note 193 (allowing a merger for
its integration qualities).
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However, there is a reasonable distinction between Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas,196  SNECMA/TI Group, Mercedes-
Benz/Kdssbohrer and the 3G license tenders. In each of these three
cases, the number of firms remained greater than the number of
contracts up for tender in a given auction.197 The tenders gave the
remaining firms an incentive to compete.198 In 3G auctions, joint
ventures and mergers may result so that the number of remaining
auction participants equals the number of 3G licenses on offer. If a
merger or joint venture is referred to the EU for pre-merger ap-
proval under Regulations 4064/89 or 1310/97, the Commission
may find that the reduction in competitors does substantially
lessen competition.199 To the Author's knowledge, no EU case or
decision thus far has looked into this question.
5.3. Prosecutorial Inefficiencies
Auction design is crucial to preempt collusion by auction bid-
ders. First, not all violations will be prosecuted because the Euro-
pean Commission has limited resources.200 Second, oligopoly mar-
kets without collusion still exhibit anticompetitive effects. Third,
even when prosecuted by the Commission, not all violations will
be remedied. The ECJ and the CFI require a higher burden of
proof in parallel behavior and concerted action cases than in ex-
plicit collusion cases. Fourth, even when prosecuted, the court
system is overburdened with cases 201 and preliminary rulings on
196 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 Declaring a Concentration Compati-
ble with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case
IV/M.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16.
'97 See also supra Section 4.3.1.3.; infra Section 6.3.
198 See BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 153, §§ 13.03-.04.
199 Compare Regulation 4064/89, supra note 13 (denying EU approval to a
merger that "creates or strengthens a dominant position"), with Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, supra note 15, §§ 0.1, 1.0, 2.0 (using the "likely substantially to lessen
competition" standard for pre-merger reviews). The EU standard seems to set a
higher bar for the antitrust regulator to block a merger.
200 The Commission only published thirty-nine cases under Articles 85 and 86
in 1999. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION: ANTITRusr CASES
CLOSED BY FORMAL DECISIONS 85/86 1999, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/antitrust/closed/en/ind990.html#1999 (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)
(listing the formal decision cases).
201 The CFI has fifteen judges that sit in chambers (panels) of three or five
judges. See Court of Justice, Composition and Organization, at http://curia.eu.int/
en/pres/co.htm. The CFI's competition caseload has increased from 25 to 36 filed
cases. The CFI's total caseload also increased; from 220 cases filed in 1996 to 387
cases filed in 2000. See Court of Justice, Statistics of Judicial Activity of the Court of
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competition law.202 Fifth, tacit collusion is probably more common
than explicit cartels, which are easier to prosecute.203 Auction de-
sign, rather than competition law, is the best preventative method.
Auction design is also needed because competition law is bu-
reaucraticaly inefficient. The Directorate of Competition ("DG
Comp) 204 is responsible for investigating competition violations
and reporting its findings to the European Commission.205 The
Commission then decides how to proceed with the information.
Because of the Commission's heavy workload (only 68 cases out of
1013 open cases were formally decided in 1999)206 only the most
serious violations end in a finding of violation by the Commis-
sion.207 Since the reform of the European Court system in 1988,208
First Instance 2000, Table 5, at http://curia.eu.int/en/stat/st0tr.pdf; Court of
Justice, Statistics of Judicial Activity of the Court of First Instance 1998, tbl. 5, at
http://curia.eu.int/en/stat/st98tr.pdf.
The ECJ has fifteen judges that sit in chambers of three or five judges, but may
also sit in plenary session (en banc) when a member state government is a party
and requests a plenary session. See Court of Justice, Composition and Organization,
supra. In 2000, the ECJ received twenty-two competition case filings of the 500
total filings (4.4%) and 803 pending cases on Dec. 31, 2000. See Court of Justice,
Statistics of Judicial Activity of the Court of Justice 2000, tbls. 11 & 14, at http:
//curia.eu.int/en/stat/stOOcr.pdf.
202 National courts can ask for preliminary rulings on points of EU competi-
tion law. However, the ECJ has warned member states that about half of its
docket is taken up by preliminary rulings, and that the court structure and re-
sources can no longer cope. Ian Forrester, Modernization of EC Competition Law, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1028,1056-57 (2000).
203 See 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 1-4,14.
204 DG IV is headed by Directorate-General Alexander Schaub, a German ca-
reer bureaucrat, and overseen by Commissioner Mario Monti, an Italian academic.
Monti is the Commissioner for Competition Policy, one of the seventeen commis-
sioners of the European Commission. The Commission is the executive branch of
the EU and operates as a cabinet containing commissioners from all EU member
states. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION DIRECrORATE-GENERAL (providing
an overview of the EU Commission and DG Comp), at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/dgs/competition/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
205 See WHIsH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 32.
206 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 1999, at
57-58 figs. 2-3 (1999) (displaying caseload statistics from 1993 to 1999), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annuaLreports/1999/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002). Domestic courts of the member states can also allow prosecution
under EU competition law subject to appeal to the ECJ. Forrester, supra note 202,
at 1034.
207 WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 285 n.5 (showing monetary fines against
violators ranging from 57.85 million to 75 million ECU).
203 Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Eurotom of 24 October 1988 Estab-
lishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Commission decisions are subject to appeal to the Court of First In-
stance.209 The CFI's main role is to monitor fact-finding disputes,
but it also writes opinions of law. Points of law are then subject to
appeal to the Court of Justice. Generally, the ECJ upholds CFI de-
cisions.210 The ECJ itself has a tremendous workload, stemming
from its work on competition law cases and the other matters in its
jurisdiction, and is therefore unable to cope with all of the ap-
peals.21'
209 See generally Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities of 19 June 1991,1991 O.J. (L176) 7 (establishing allow-
able appeals from the Commission to the CFI and from the CFI to the ECJ).
210 WHISH & SUFRIN, supra note 11, at 32-33.
211 Id. at 32-33, 285-88; see also supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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6. EVALUATING THE U.K., GERMAN, AND ITALIAN
AUCTION REGULATIONS
212
212 The Dutch auction would have also been appropriate for comparison, but
is not analyzed because of the difficulty in obtaining a publicly available English
language text of the auction rules. The Dutch auction occurred after the British
and German auctions. The Netherlands auctioned five blocks in two sizes (three
of the five bands were larger than the other two). Initially, eight firms decided to
enter the auction and everything looked as if it were going as planned. See 3G
Country Information, supra note 22. Minutes before the start, two bidders pulled
out. Hutchinson 3G, a dominant firm in wireless services, pulled out by forming
a joint venture with KPN (the former Dutch telephone monopoly) and NTT Do-
CoMo (the major Japanese wireless provider) for all future European 3G auctions.
Such a loss put the auction in jeopardy because five dominant Dutch incumbent
competitors and one newcomer remained in the auction for five licenses. The out-
come was clear. After 297 rounds of bidding on July 21, 2000, Versatel, the new-
comer, withdrew from the auction. See Eric van Damme, CPB Netherlands Bu-
reau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Dutch UMTS Auction in Retrospect, at 28-29,
available at http://www.cpb.nl/nl/cpbreport/200l2/s2_2.pdf. Versatel accused
Telfort (British Telecomm's Dutch subsidiary and one of the winning firms) of: (1)
illegally trying to fix bids during a meeting between Versatel and Telfort repre-
sentatives in the days before the auction; and (2) threatening legal action if Ver-
satel continued to bid in the auction. See Clayton Hirst, Threat to BT as Regulators
Probe Dutch Phone Auction, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 14, 2001, at 1, available at
2001 WL 2787360. Versatel also claimed that such a communication during the
auction amounted to a violation of the auction rules. See Versatel Goes to Court
Over UMTS Licence [sic], HEr FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD, Apr. 10, 2001, available at 2001
WL 4346151 (dismissing Versatel's suit when the court found that the communi-
cation during the auction did not violate the rules and that it had no effect on the
auction outcome). For its part, Telfort believed that Versatel remained in the auc-
tion to drive up the cost of the 3G licenses for the winners while not actually
wanting a license. Telfort accused Versatel of manipulating the cost structure of
3G service providers while Versatel remained a 2G provider. Some commentators
believe that Versatels strategy was to enter the auction to force a dominant firm
to form a 3G joint venture with it. See van Damme, supra, at 28. This was obvi-
ously legal as Hutchinson 3G, KPN and NIT DoCoMo had done just that. Also,
in the days preceding the auction, Versatel's website expressed its desire to form a
3G alliance in the Netherlands. See id.
The Netherlands Competition Authority ("NMa") raided the offices of both
companies in November. See Press Release, Netherlands Competition Authority,
NMa Starts Investigation into the Situation Surrounding the UMTS Auction (Nov. 3,
2000) [hereinafter NMa Press Release], at http://www.nma-org.nl/english/press
/pr0024.htm. The authorities operated under the theory that the two companies
had met in the days before the auction to coordinate their auction behavior. To
add to NMa's suspicion, Versatel and Telfort were already partners in a fixed-line
telephone venture in the Netherlands. Telfort and BT claim that the purpose of
the suspicious meeting was to discuss issues related to the joint venture and not to
discuss the auction. See Hirst, supra. In fact the raids occurred two days after a
Telfort representative, testifying at a government hearing, stated that representa-
tives of the two parties had met See van Damme, supra, at 28; NMa Press Release,
supra; 3G Country Information, supra note 22. Three months later the NMa closed
the investigation because it had found no antitrust violations. See "Versatel and
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Each of the three auction systems discussed below contains
flaws. The U.K. system successfully prevented collusion, but suf-
fered from the winner's curse. Germany offered a somewhat elas-
tic supply of spectrum blocks at the risk of collusion in both the
auction and the 3G services market. The German auction also suf-
fered from the winner's curse. The Italian auction's disastrous out-
come exemplifies the need for proper auction design. Each coun-
try's regulation was passed by its relevant telecommunications
authority rather than by its legislature, which allowed those with
greater expertise to design the auction. Each country also provided
a highly detailed regulation. The following analysis highlights the
key provisions that made successful outcome more or less likely.
6.1. The United Kingdom
Britain was the first country to competitively tender 3G spec-
trum rights.213 After seven weeks and 150 bidding rounds, five
spectrum blocks were distributed. 214 The British auction success-
fully prevented collusion. The tendering raised £22.5 billion ($36
billion or 630 Euro per capita),215 three hundred percent above the
government's original expectation.216 Several key auction design
elements provided such an impressive outcome.
First, the auction offered one more block for sale then the num-
ber of domestic incumbents. Four firms operated wireless services
in the U.K. and five blocks were auctioned. 217 This ensured a posi-
tive probability of success for potential new entrants and encour-
aged their participation in the auction. It also ensured greater
competition in the wireless services market after the auction, which
is especially important given that the four current U.K. firms are
Telfort Did Not Conspire During UNTS [sicJ-Auction," DE VOLKSKRANT, Feb. 23,
2001, at 2, available at 2001 WL 4717384.
213 Licensing Conditions & Status, supra note 8, at 5.
214 3G Country Information, supra note 22.
215 Id.; 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 20.
216 Mobile-Phone Commerce and Europe's Licence Auctions, ECONOMIST, July 8,
2000, available at 2000 WL 8142756.
217 The Wireless Telegraphy (Third Generation Licenses) Notice 1999, § 4.3.37
(Dep't of Trade & Indus.) (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter The Wireless Telegraphy
Notice] (detailing the auction rules promulgated by the Patricia Hewitt, the Min-
ister for Small Business and E-Commerce), at http://www.spectrumauctions
.gov.uk/wireless telegraphy.htm.
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under investigation by the Office of Telecommunications ("Oftel")
for price fixing.218
The fifth block encouraged nine potential entrants to join the
four incumbents in the auction. TIW, a Canadian company, won
the rights to the fifth block and joined the four domestic firms,
One-to-One, BT, Orange, and Vodafone-Airtouch, 219 in providing
3G wireless services.
Second, the blocks were not homogeneous. One large block,
three identical small blocks and one mid-sized block were auc-
tioned.220 This reduced the ability of a cartel to organize and col-
lude on the prices of each block. It also reduced cartel behavior in
3G services because inputs would not be homogeneous for com-
petitors.
Third, the largest block was reserved for a non-incumbent
firm,22' and each bidder could only purchase one block.2m This en-
sured new entry and guaranteed the new entrant the highest qual-
ity block, giving the new entrant a quality advantage to success-
fully enter the 3G service market. However, new entrants were
allowed to bid on any block. Therefore, the unreserved blocks
were substitutes for the reserved block. This ensured a high price
for each auction block and not just for the reserved block.223
Fourth, the auction regulators monitored for anticompetitive
joint ventures and cross-ownership. As discussed in Section 5.2.,
such behavior may be beyond the reach of EU competition law. In
order to be eligible to enter the auction, firms had to submit own-
ership forms that listed all entities that owned at least fifteen per-
cent of the firm.224 The regulator could have blocked joint ventures
deemed anticompetitive. This prevented cartels from narrowing
the field of bidders.
218 The present U.K. wireless market is the focus of a competition law inves-
tigation for possible collusion. See Ben Hunt, UK Regulator Questions Mobile Phone
Pricing, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2001, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com
/globalarchive/article.html?id=010207006939.
219 3G Country Information, supra note 22, at 9.
220 The Wireless Telegraphy Notice, supra note 217, § 4.3.37(b).
221 Id. § 3.4.
222 Id. § 4.7.1.
223 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 153, §§ 13.03-.04.
224 The Wireless Telegraphy Notice, supra note 217, § 3.7 (requiring the listing
of all persons, consortiums, or companies that owned over 15% of the cooperation
or group).
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Fifth, the auction prevented cartel monitoring. At the end of
each round, the highest current bid was announced. However, the
identity of the winner was not disclosed,225 and submitted bids
were rounded up to the nearest £10,000 to prevent signaling.226
Lastly, the auction would not have taken place if less than
seven bidders were approved to participate in the auction.227 This
ensured that the auction would not proceed unless there was suffi-
cient interest and liquidity. Thirteen bidders entered the U.K. auc-
tion, ensuring a high price for the government assets.228
The U.K. auction was hailed a success in the press. Yet, earning
three hundred percent above expectations is evidence that a win-
ner's curse probably occurred. Third Generation wireless provi-
sion is a high risk venture. The market demand, costs, and techni-
cal developments are all unknowns. Bids should have been
shaved, not exaggerated, to ensure the financial health of the in-
dustry. Following the analysis of the German and Italian auctions,
this Comment will discuss the winner's curse problem in the U.K.
and German auctions.
6.2. Germany
Like the U.K. auction, the German spectrum rights sold well in
excess of their expected value. Germany raised DM98.8 billion
($46.26 billion, or 615 Euro per capita).229 After fourteen days and
173 rounds of bidding, six firms won spectrum rights.230 Unlike
the U.K. auction, the German bidding rules did not seem to fully
prevent collusion during or after the auction. However, Germany
raised $10 billion more than the U.K.231
Germany used an unlimited multi-round auction.232 Before the
auction began, potential bidders had to pass a preliminary stage.
225 Id. § 4.3.11.
226 Id. §§ 4.3.17,4.3.26.
227 Id. § 3.6.1.
M 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 19-20.
229 Sidenbladh, Current Status of 3G Licensing, supra note 6, at 9; 2 Klemperer,
supra note 47, at 32.
230 3G Country Information, supra note 22.
231 Despite this impressive difference, the German auction only raised 98% of
the per capita revenue raised by the U.K. auction. See 2 Klemperer, supra note 47,
at 23.
232 Rules for Conduct of the Auction for the Award of Licenses for the
UMTS/IMT-2000: Third Generation Mobile Communications, v. 18.2.2000 (BK-lb-
98/005-2), § A(3.2) (F.R.G.) (translated by President's Chamber for promulgation,
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Regulators based approval on the technical and financial ability to
purchase the spectrum and operate a 3G network.233 Each bidder
was required to submit ownership and joint venture statements as
well as applications listing its wireless operations in other coun-
tries.23 4 This allowed pre-auction monitoring for cartel attempts to
reduce the number of bidders through joint ventures.
To prevent cartel monitoring, the auction separated the bidders
into several rooms in the auction building.23 5 The bidders submit-
ted their bids through an auction computer system and fax ma-
chines.236 The bids were to be. submitted in DM100,000 incre-
ments 7  These combined measures prevented monitoring,
signaling, and communication between bidders during the auction.
However, the auction failed to fully prevent monitoring. At the
end of each forty minute round the identity of the highest bidder
was announced.2 m This could enable a cartel to monitor member
behavior.
The German auction was unique because it auctioned a varied
number of licenses, but a fixed number of blocks. Twelve spec-
only German text shall prevail) [hereinafter German Rules for Conduct of the
Auction], at http://www.regtp.de/en/index.html.
233 Determinations and Rules for the Award of Licenses for the UMTS/IMT-
2000: Third Generation Mobile Communications, v. 18.2.2000 (BK-lb-98/005-1), §§
1, II.Re 1 (F.R.G.) (translated by President's Chamber for promulgation, only
German text shall prevail) [hereinafter German Determinations and Rules for
Award], at http://www.regtp.de/en/index.html; German Rules for Conduct of
the Auction, supra note 232, § A(1).
234 German Determinations and Rules for Award, supra note 233, § 1; see also
id. at 12-13 (stating the need for would-be bidders to guarantee availability of
means of production so as to prove that they have the financial means to acquire a
license).
235 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, §§ A(3.1)-(3.2).
Germany used a former United States military base to house the auction. See
Germany Starts Mobile Auctions, BBC NEws, July 31, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/business/newsid_856000/856099.stm/.
236 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, § B(8). How-
ever, it seems from the press that this was not adequate. Since the bids were so
high, the last several allowable digits were no longer of consequence to the auc-
tion value. Attempts at signaling by Vodafone-Mannesman have been alleged.
Vodafone-Mannesman was ending its bids in a non-zero number. See 2 Klem-
perer, supra note 47, at 2-3, 23-24; Bertrand Benoit et a., Italy Demands Inquiry into
3G Phone Auctions, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at 1 (reporting that Germany has de-
cined to investigate the charges due to the high revenues of the auction and the
difficulty of proving that the signal was intended, received and effective under
competition law).
237 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, §§ B(3.6), B(5.3).
23 Id. § A(3.8).
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trum blocks were auctioned, but participants had to bid on two or
three blocks in each round.239 Therefore, four to six firms would
win a license of either two or three blocks. Each block was a nar-
row paired band of frequency. The multiple combinations of fre-
quency meant the spectrum quality was variable. This reduced the
facilitating factors for collusion by varying quantity and quality of
the spectrum.
Having only five dominant firms in Germany meant that if six
licenses were to be awarded, a new entrant was guaranteed. The
after-market would be more competitive.240 The auction would at-
tract non-dominant bidders and drive up the price of all blocks be-
cause each block was a substitute for every other block. 241 How-
ever, if only four licenses were purchased, then the five domestic
wireless companies would compete for the rights to a four member
oligopoly.242 This would have driven up the auction revenues, but
would have reduced later competition. A danger would exist if the
five dominant firms were to signal their intent to divide the avail-
able blocks into five groupings. This would dissuade non-
dominant firms from entering the auction because their probability
of success would be extremely low. 243
Perhaps collusion was prevented by the confusion of the vari-
able four-to-six winner system. Having four or six winners meant
having identical quality spectrum purchases (all two or all three
blocks each). Five winning firms would have resulted in two firms
owning three blocks and three firms owning two blocks. A cartel
would have a difficult time organizing which members were to
own two or three blocks and at what relative prices each were to be
fixed. Varied spectrum size would also complicate a services mar-
239 German Determinations and Rules for Award, supra note 233, at 70-73;
German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, § B(1).
240 To further facilitate 3G competition, phone numbers were assigned in
blocks to each winning telecom. However, once a number is assigned to a cus-
tomer, the customer owns the number. When the customer decides to switch tele-
coms, the phone number is portable. German Determinations and Rules for
Award, supra note 233, at 25. This may seem small, but it is an important facilita-
tor of competition in the 3G services market.
241 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, §§ B(3.2)-(3.4).
242 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 22, 23 n.54 (declaring the German auction
lucky despite risking an overly concentrated services market by possibly award-
ing only four blocks).
243 Id. at 22-24.
[23:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss1/6
AUCTION THEORY & COMPETITION LAW
ket cartel because the difference in bandwidth would lead to dif-
ferences in cost structures and the quality of services.
The greatest prevention against collusion may have been the
"Prohibition of Collusion" section of the 3G auction regulation.
244
The "Prohibition of Collusion" exists separately from the EU or
German competition laws.245 If the regulator discovers collusion,
the spectrum is revoked, and the fine equals the amount bid by
that company in securing a license.
246
To protect the government from discovered or undiscovered
cartel effects, the auction used both a reserve price and a version of
a royalty scheme. The reserve price of each block was DM200 mil-
lion ($185 million or 204 million Euro).247 The royalty scheme
would charge firms an operations fee if the auction earned the
government less than the government's administrative cost.248 The
reimbursement for administrative cost was set at only DM5 million
per license, well under the reserve price. This would have only be-
come an issue if the auction was a disaster and needed to be rerun
at a lower reserve price.249
The German auction succeeded in preventing the occurrence of
collusion. The revenues greatly exceeded expectations. As in the
U.K. case, the auction design did not adequately account for the
winner's curse. The winner's curse did not dissuade entry from
either the British or German auctions because they were the first
two auctions of 3G services. However, their excess prices have al-
ready hurt the industry, as share prices in Europe's telecom sector
continue to fall and corporate debt burdens rise. The high prices in
Germany's auction were exaggerated because the minimum bid in
any one round had to exceed the previous high bid by ten per-
cent.2m Bids escalated quickly and were difficult to control. This
may prove fatal for the German and British wireless markets. They
may suffer from a delayed launch of 3G services and reduced tech-
244 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, § B(9).
245 Id. §§ B(9.3), Re B(9.3).
246 Id. §§ Re B(9.1)-(9.2).
247 Id. § A(1.3).
248 German Determinations and Rules for Award, supra note 233, at 26-27.
249 Id.
250 German Rules for Conduct of the Auction, supra note 232, § Re B(5) (forc-
ing the minimum bid to be 10% until the auctioneer determines bids are high
enough and wishes to reduce the increment to 5% or 2%).
20021
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nical development because of the capital resources diverted to
auction debts.
6.3. Italy
The Italian 3G tender raised little revenue. The auction col-
lected only 12.16 billion Euro as opposed to the 20 to 30 billion
Euro that Italy had expected (240 Euro per capita, and only 40% of
the per capita U.K. revenues).2 51 The auction design contained sev-
eral flaws. Not all of the flaws played a role in the outcome be-
cause the auction ended after just ten rounds. The joint venture
between British Telecomm ("BT"), seven non-telecom Italian com-
panies, and Blu, an Italian telecom, pulled out of the auction over a
shareholder dispute.2 2 This left only five bidders for five hi-
censes.253
Italy had four incumbent firms: Blu, Telecom Italia Mobile,
Omnitel, and Wind.54 Blu was such a small firm that only the
other three should be considered dominant. Therefore, the number
of bidders exceeded the number of blocks. As discussed earlier,
having more blocks than dominant firms would encourage en-
trance by ensuring new telecom firms access to the wireless mar-
ket.
The Italian auction, like the German and British auctions, was a
multi-round auction.255 However, the bids were only partially
sealed.2 56 Bidders were placed in individual rooms and were
barred from communicating with each other.257 After each round,
a list of all participants and their current bids was announced to
each bidder.258 This could obviously facilitate collusion by pro-
viding the cartel with a monitoring system.
251 Italian Mobile Licenses Go Cheap, BBC NEws, Oct. 23, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid 986000/986193.stm/. The
value was about one-third the revenue per capita as the German or British auc-
tions. Id.; see also 2 Klemperer, supra note 47, at 21, 32.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 3G Country Information, supra note 22 (detailing the Italian 3G experience).
255 Tender Regulations, Gazz. Uff. No. 117, Part II, § 7.1.2(c), July 25, 2000 (It.)
(translation by Committee of Ministers, only Italian text shall prevail), at
http://www.agcom.it/provv/3generaz.htm/.
256 Id. §§ 8.1.4(d)-(f).
257 Id. §§ 7.1.2(e), 7.2.6-.2.7.
258 Id. §§ 8.1.4(d)-(g).
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Unlike the German and British auctions, the Italian statute set
up homogeneous blocks. Each winning firm would receive one
paired and one unpaired block.259 Having a homogeneous product
would facilitate collusion in the auction and in the 3G services
market.
On the positive side, the Italian auction did limit the potential
effects of an auction ring. It was the only auction analyzed that re-
stricted the transferability of the spectrum block after the auction;
firms could not resell their blocks until four years after purchase.
260
There were two fatal flaws in the auction design. Both oc-
curred before the monitoring system could aid collusion, as the
bidding ended after only ten rounds. First, the regulation con-
tained a prohibition on "Anti-Competitive Activities."26
1 The
problem with this provision is that it did not provide sufficient
punishment for collusion; it did not impose fines for an infraction
of the rules as the German regulation did. Bidders were merely
excluded from participating in the auction.262 Since the bidding
had only one more participant than blocks available, any exclusion
for anticompetitive behavior would bring the auction to a dose.
Without a monetary penalty or a reduction in the number of blocks
on offer, exclusion would seriously dampen government revenues.
Second, the Italian auction mainly failed to raise revenue be-
cause of joint ventures. Unlike the British and German regulation
which barred certain joint ventures, the Italian regulation specifi-
cally allowed all joint ventures to form.263 Consequently, collusive
behavior was evident at the auction. Four of the winning five bid-
ders were joint ventures of at least two major telecom compa-
nies.264 As discussed earlier, the key to affecting the auction price
259 Id. § 8.1.2 (providing 2X10 MHz paired and 5MHz unpaired).
260 Tender Regulations, Gazz. Uff. No. 117, Part II, § 2.2, July 25, 2000 (It.)
(translation by Committee of Ministers, only Italian text shall prevail), at
http://wviv.agcom.it/provv/3generaz.htm/.
261 Id. § 7.3.
262 Id. § 7.3.5.
263 Id.§ 4.1.
264 (1) Onnitel is owned by Vodafone and Verizon. (2) Wind is owned by
France Telecom and Enel, the Italian power group. The winning new entrants
were also joint ventures. (3) Ipse is a consortium of several firms. Its largest own-
ers are Telefonica of Spain and Sonera of Finland. (4) Andala is owned by Tiscali-
IMI and the Hong Kong holding company Hutchinson-Whampoa (which subse-
quently formed a pan-European joint venture with NTT DoCoMo of Japan). See
3G Country Information, supra note 22.
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is reducing the number of bidders to equal the number of auction
blocks.
The bidding came to a halt when Blu pulled out of the auction
after only two days of bidding, amid shareholder in-fighting. Al-
though a majority of its shareholders voted to remain in the auc-
tion, its internal by-laws required an eighty percent majority to
submit bids. It was obvious from the start that Blu was a weak
auction participant. Blu was only eighteen months old and held
under one percent of the Italian cellular market. While Blu in-
cluded the telecommunications giant BT, BT had only a twenty
percent stake, and none of its other participants were telecommu-
nications companies. Many of them were worried about BT's debt
level from previous 3G auctions and the anticipated high price of
Italian 3G licenses.265 The Italian government withheld Blu's four
trillion lira ($1.7 billion or 2.1 billion Euro) auction deposit fee for
its early withdrawal,266 claiming that Blu was not a serious partici-
pant and disrupted the auction. Italy subsequently returned the
money to Blu after a court battle.267
The Italian competition authority, Antitrust, launched a major
investigation into collusive behavior following rumors of price
fixing.268 In July 2001, Antitrust closed the investigation after
finding no violations.269 The EU is also monitoring collusion across
all of Europe's 3G auctions following antitrust allegations in Italy
and the Netherlands.270 Italy has raided twenty offices to investi-
gate the alleged collusion.271
265 Madaleine Dyer, Auction Blues, COMM. INT'L, Dec. 1, 2000, at 4546, at 2000
WL 10977419.
266 Id.
267 Liz Vaughan-Adams, BT's Italian Job Turns Investors Blu, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 6, 2001, at 21, at 2001 WL 27726321.
268 Dyer, supra note 265, at 4546; Benoit, supra note 236, at 1; James Blitz, Brus-
sels Monitors 3G Auctions, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, available at
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=00110100
1682/; Press Release, Antitrust, The Competition Authority Has Opened an In-
vestigation Into the UMTS Tender (Oct. 27, 2000) at http://www.agcm.it/eng/
tema04.htm.
269 Competition Watchdog Closes Italian UMTS Auction Probe, CORRIERE DELLA
SERA, July 21, 2001, at 22, available at 2001 WL 6005570.
270 Id.
271 Dan Roberts et al., Italy Calls for 3G Auction Inquiry, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2000, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.htmlprint
=true&id=001031000617/.
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Italy provides a clear example that expresses the importance of
ex ante auction design. Collusion would have been prevented or
discouraged if Italy regulated joint ventures better, prohibited
monitoring, and differentiated the product (spectrum). Instead, It-
aly has lost government revenue and conducted a lengthy and
costly competition law inquiry.m
7. SOLUTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS ON THE U.K.
AND GERMAN SYSTEMS
The German and U.K. auctions led to high corporate debt lev-
els.2n The markets have devalued telecommunications stocks
274
and banks have tightened telecommunications loan require-
ments275 in response to a perceived winner's curse.276 BT's former
CEO, Sir Peter Bonfield, even admitted that his company overpaid
for its 3G auction procurements by £10 billion ($15.7 billion).277
Nevertheless, the German and British systems are far superior
to the Italian auction. Britain and Germany raised impressive
amounts of government revenue, prevented collusion, and reduced
the need for competition law investigations. Their problem lies in
risk allocation. Third Generation services are a high-risk industry,
as the government and the firms do not know the potential de-
mand, the start up costs, or future changes in technology. Forcing
up-front fixed payments has lead to the winner's curse.278 The
V2 Id.
273 Killer Applications: Investors are Beginning to Worry About the Financial Vi-
ability of Europe's Free-Spending Telecoms Giants, ECONoMIsT, Aug. 26, 2000, at 61.
274 Id.; Davos: Fears for Europe, BBC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc. co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid-1137000/1137765.stm/.
275 Dan Roberts et al., Finance Fears Haunt 3G, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, avail-
able at http://globalarchive.ft-com/globalarchive/article.html?id=001208000445/.
276 Philip Coggan, Winner Takes All the Risk, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,2001, at 15.
277 Alan Cane, BT Considers Full Demerger of Wireless, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,2001,
at 16.
2n There are, of course, alternative explanations for the high price of the
British and German auctions. Although they followed the Finnish allocation, they
were the next two auctions and the first set of auctions in major markets. The
British and German auctions may have experienced high prices because they col-
lected an "entry fee" for the following auctions. To have a successful Europe-
wide 3G service, any competitor needed to enter these two major markets. In the
following auctions, the losers from the earlier auctions would not submit bids be-
cause they had already lost the opportunity to become a major European player.
Even if they enter future auctions, they would seek to be a local 3G provider; their
bids will not be as high as the pan-European suppliers. This phenomenon will
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winner's curse has three future effects. First, it will hurt the finan-
cial health of the country that has caused the winner's curse. Sec-
ond, the winning firms will suffer high debts, which will affect
their ability to participate in other 3G auctions. Third, future 3G
auctions will have fewer participants because firms that suffered
the curse will be unable to enter, and other firms will be dissuaded
by the possibility of a winner's curse.
To prevent the winner's curse from occurring and dissuading
future entry, a royalty system needs to be used.279 A royalty pay-
ment would resemble a lease rather than a sale of assets. Instead of
announcing a dollar amount for their bids, firms would bid by of-
fering the government a set percentage of revenue (not profits).
Each firm would quote a continually higher percentage as bidding
progressed.
A royalty system would have a number of benefits. First, it
would spread payment over time. Second, the risk would be
spread between the government and firms. Thus, the winner's
curse would be less likely, as consumer demand would determine
the firm's price, instead of highly unreliable market projections.
After monitoring the situation in Europe, Hong Kong plans to use
a hybrid royalty system to avoid the winner's curse while ensuring
government revenues.280 Under the Hong Kong system, the auc-
tion winners will pay a set price for five years. Their bids will be
the percentage of revenue that they offer the government over the
remainder of the license.281 As for the Italian system, stronger
oversight of joint ventures is needed.282
lower auction prices in future European tender offers. See van Damme, supra note
212, at 4.
279 See John G. Riley, Ex Post Information in Auctions, 55 REv. ECON. STUDIES
409-30 (analyzing the oil industry and arguing that in high risk auctions where the
true value of the object is only discovered ex post, a royalty system provides a
more accurate value and avoids the winner's curse).
280 Rahul Jacob, Royalty System for HK Mobile Auction, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2001, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/artices.html?print
=true&id=010214001151.
281 Id.
282 The Czech system is learning from the Italian experience. Instead of al-
lowing the domestic telecommunications companies to compete in Czech's auc-
tion, they will be charged a mandatory fee to operate a 3G system. A one block
auction will be held amongst new entrants.
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8. CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown the importance of auction design in
impeding collusive behavior before it hurts auctions of govern-
ment assets. Auctioneers must take preventative measures against
the winner's curse and collusion. As more countries around the
world begin to auction off 3G spectrum rights, they can learn from
Europe's experience. In particular, countries outside of Europe
and North America need to institute anti-collusive measures, as
few have competition laws on which to rely. Ex ante auction de-
sign regulations provide a cost effective alternative to ex post com-
petition law inquires.
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